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Leadership requires many strategies and techniques, and in politics, the stakes are high. 
During World War II, in particular, the consequences of failed leadership could have altered the 
future of political order across the globe. However, the Big Three, the leaders of the allied US, 
UK and the USSR successfully navigated the perils of war to victory. This study aims to 
understand if the actual leadership of Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin 
matched any patterns that political theorists may have predicted. Specifically, this thesis aims to 
understand if Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin utilized Machiavellian frameworks or techniques in 
their executive roles. 
Few theorists were as provocative as Niccoló Machiavelli. Famously, the Florentine 
strategist crafted a detailed and controversial theory on how to lead a state as an executive in his 
treatise, The Prince. While this work focused on principalities, Machiavelli’s principles can be 
applied to many different forms of political leadership. This thesis offers a limited analysis of 
Machiavelli’s writings, restricting the research to The Prince to make the project more feasible 
and to eliminate potential contradictions in Machiavelli’s canon. In the scope of research, 
though, this thesis investigates how readily The Prince’s theoretical model of leadership was 
actually adopted by the main Allied leaders in World War II. 
The application of Machiavelli to the Big Three accomplishes three core academic tasks. 
First, this thesis isolates lauded traits from the text of The Prince, creating a leadership 
framework to which ideal Machiavellian leaders adhere, while also clarifying and analyzing the 
text itself. Next, this research matches this framework with the WWII tenures of Stalin, Churchill 
and Roosevelt, providing unique historical leadership analysis and casting new insights on the 




applying classic theorists to modern examples, though any additional applications are for future 
research. 
Within the scope of this thesis, clear Machiavellian patterns emerged in the thorough 
accounts of the WWII tenures of Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt. First, there is no compelling 
evidence that these leaders acted because of The Prince. However, this research clearly 
demonstrates that the Big Three certainly acted in the spirit of the treatise to varying extents. 
Stalin, the most notoriously authoritarian of the three Allied leaders, demonstrated his strength of 
will, but made multiple aberrations from a Machiavellian framework in his foreign and military 
failings, despite ultimately maneuvering to become a geopolitical superpower. Churchill, on the 
other hand, demonstrated many actions and traits espoused in The Prince in foreign and military 
affairs, but famously lost domestic power before the war was over. Interestingly, Roosevelt 
proved the most Machiavellian of all, managing to maintain foreign, military and domestic 
dominance until his death at the end of the war. 
In all, through intentional design, a well-researched theoretical framework and a thorough 
applied theory and analysis, this thesis successfully answers the question: How did the political 
philosophy of Machiavelli in The Prince manifest itself in the WWII leadership of Roosevelt, 











 The research design of this thesis is twofold. First, it develops a summarized framework 
of Machiavelli’s leadership advice in The Prince. Second, this framework is applied to the case 
studies of executive leadership in World War II. After applying this framework to specific 
instances and actions, the actual applicability or use of Machiavellian techniques can be 
determined. 
For the purposes of this study, the understanding of Machiavelli’s leadership philosophy 
will come from The Prince. Generally, this research will be a qualitative analysis, requiring 
argumentation and interpretation. However, to make this thesis as objective as possible, 
Machiavelli’s political leadership ideology will be identified, defined and codified into simple 
clauses and groupings. After a review and analysis of The Prince, this thesis will develop key 
traits or elements that can be identified as “Machiavellian.” This research will pull in 
Machiavelli’s own words and descriptions from the context of Renaissance Italy and generate a 
more universal depiction of the Florentine’s ideology. 
The Prince can broadly be divided into two themes, descriptive politics and normative 
politics. These two themes are interwoven throughout the work, but are identifiable by their word 
choice and subject matter. His descriptive claims depict his interpretation of the political 
landscape. Using a mix of historical and Renaissance examples and sweeping generalities, he 
attempts to describe how the world is, in particular the world of an executive head of state. These 
are informative and provocative in their own right, but are not relevant to this thesis. Arguing 
about the validity of Machiavelli’s world view in The Prince in the context of World War II is a 




Instead, this work will focus on the normative prescriptions Machiavelli details in The 
Prince. Throughout his treatise, the Florentine advises leaders on certain ways to act, with 
phrases like “the prince must” or “a prince should” (Machiavelli, 1988, 42, 58). This thesis will 
identify these norms and group Machiavelli’s guiding principles for a leader. Additionally, this 
work will add interpretations and modernizations of The Prince’s leadership criteria, taking the 
work from a monarchic, Renaissance context and making it applicable to an executive, 20th-
century context. Ultimately, with the amalgamation of all these statements, the image of an ideal 
Machiavellian leader will appear.  
This Machiavellian image and his underlying leadership criteria can then be taken and 
compared with the careers and actions of actual historical leaders. Through analysis and 
argumentation, leadership histories can be weighed against these criteria to determine how 
Machiavellian the leaders were or were not. In the present thesis, these criteria will be applied to 
the careers of the Big Three during the Second World War to determine if their actions generally 
reflected a Machiavellian technique, strategy or understanding of politics. The exact criteria are 
described in the Theoretical Framework.  
 After exhaustive reading on Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt, this Theoretical Framework 
will be applied to their personal histories in order to make broad arguments about their actions 
during World War II. The specific cases selected are used as examples of general trends and 
attitudes in play throughout the war. They are meant to be illustrative of a broader pattern of 
leadership identified and explained in the Applied Theory sections. The specific cases chosen are 
organized based on a logical grouping of Machiavelli’s leadership traits. The groupings reflect 
multiple aspects of modern political leadership spanning the breadth of any politician’s career, 




Other analyses could arrange Machiavelli’s leadership criteria in a variety of ways, but this thesis 
will broadly group theoretical criteria and historical action along those categories for better 
understanding and argumentation. 
To start, this thesis will compare Machiavelli’s traits with Joseph Stalin’s leadership in 
the USSR. First, this research will investigate Stalin’s foreign affairs, in particular his non-
aggression treaty with Hitler, followed by his ignorance of changing Nazi attitudes, then his 
ultimate use of Allied resources. Second, the study will focus on Stalin’s military exploits during 
the war, notably the attacks on Poland and Finland, the response to German aggression, the 
defense of Moscow, the purging of military personnel and then general military strategy. Next, 
there will be an investigation on Stalin’s domestic affairs during the war, especially his 
deportation and arrest of dissident groups. Throughout, the thesis will include Stalin’s personal 
conduct, ranging from his rhetoric, to his advisors and lastly to his image and temperament. 
These specific and important examples can create a general inference as to Stalin’s adherence to 
Machiavelli’s political understandings. 
Next, this thesis will apply a Machiavellian understanding of leadership to Winston 
Churchill’s time as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. First, this research will focus on the 
circumstances of Churchill’s foreign affairs, especially his relation to staying in the war despite 
the surrender of France and some domestic pressure for appeasement. Next, the thesis will look 
at his military policy, in particular his retreat at Dunkirk, his rhetoric during the Battle of Britain 
and his push for action in North Africa and the Mediterranean. Further, this investigation will 
cover Churchill’s domestic policy and action, covering his initial success in coalition building, 
but also his ultimate loss of the premiership. In all the sections, this paper will review Churchill’s 




actions and events offer an overview of Churchill’s policy choices, and can serve as a barometer 
of the Prime Minister’s Machiavellian leanings. 
Then, the understanding of Machiavelli’s leadership framework must be analyzed in 
relation to U.S. executive leadership under Franklin D. Roosevelt during the Second World War. 
This thesis will track four major realms in FDR’s tenure as measuring points for his style of 
leadership. First, this will look in-depth at his actions in foreign relations, notably his initial 
decision to stay out of the War, but also his supplying of resources to both the UK and the 
USSR. Next, research will follow Roosevelt’s military decisions, focusing on the opening of a 
second front in Europe and his general military appointments and decisions. After, there will be 
an investigation of FDR’s domestic affairs, such as his use of internment camps and election 
success. Within these sections, Roosevelt’s rhetoric, circle of advisors and temperament can also 
be revealed. These illustrative cases should provide ample evidence as to how FDR chose to 
lead, and how his style did or did not reflect a Machiavellian understandings of politics.  
 Finally, the Allied Relations section will cover direct interactions between the Big Three. 
The work between Roosevelt and Churchill will feature heavily, with details about their 
negotiations and alliance, solidified through the Atlantic Charter, numerous arms supply deals 
and notoriously through a joint nuclear weapons development pact. The Tehran and Yalta 
conferences, the only time the Big Three leaders interacted together in person, will serve as final 
case studies to epitomize and understand the Machiavellian traits, or lack thereof, among 
Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin.  
 Ultimately, these different case studies provide real-life application of Machiavelli’s 




theory framework. This design will effectively answer if the Machiavellian tendencies of The 
Prince expressed themselves in the Big Three and to what extent. 
 
Theoretical Framework and Literature Review 
 Machiavelli’s most famous work, The Prince, makes a number of normative claims about 
what a leader, in this case a prince, should do in order to maintain his state. On its face, these 
claims apply to the leader of a principality, especially in the context of Renaissance Italy. 
However, this thesis identifies these claims and reinterprets them in a modern context applicable 
to any executive leader, making Machiavelli useful to leadership analyses of any recent 
executive. Cumulatively, these claims create a leadership model. To identify these different 
claims, this research has parsed the text of The Prince and selected all passages with normative 
statements, centering on the phrases “must” and “should.” These statements are then grouped 
into four broad categories: domestic affairs, foreign affairs, military affairs and personal conduct. 
These categories are used purely for organization and for ease of analysis and seemed the most 
logical, exhaustive and exclusive grouping. Naturally, there is occasional overlap of a criterion 
between the categories, which will come more in to play during the application of this 
framework to actual leadership scenarios. This framework explanation, though, will identify each 
normative criterion from The Prince and explain its relevance in a modern context and grouping, 
helping to establish an overall image of leadership. 
Domestic Affairs 
 Understandably, Machiavelli’s advice to a prince includes the ordering of affairs within 
the principality itself. His directions suggest how a leader should order, influence and ultimately 




1. Use force when necessary: In Machiavelli’s words, “things must be ordered in such a 
mode that when [the people] no longer believe, one can make them believe by force” 
(1988, 24). Essentially, leaders who intend to change the order or norms in a society need 
to have force to bring about those changes. Machiavelli claims that the establishment of a 
new social order cannot be done merely through the introduction of a belief structure. 
Rather, this new belief structure needs to be supported by the threat or use of force. He 
cites the historical-mythological examples of “Moses, Cyrus, Theseus and Romulus,” 
saying that the adoption of their new “constitutions” would have faltered “if they had 
been unarmed” (1998, 24). In a modern context, this concept implies that leaders need 
enforcement mechanisms to push through social, policy and normative changes. Belief 
alone is not sufficient. 
2. Perform injuries together: Simply, The Prince argues, “for injuries must be done all 
together” (1988, 38). Injuries, in this context, are negative impacts or evils performed on 
the citizenry that are deemed necessary to establish power and control of the state. In an 
ancient context, this could range from killing citizens to lying, betrayal and beyond 
(Machiavelli, 1988, 35). Machiavelli urges that if cruel acts must be done, that a prince 
should perform them “at a stroke” so that “tasted less, they offend less” (Machiavelli, 
1988, 38). If a leader has to act with evil, do it in one stroke, making it overwhelming and 
less noticed on the basis of any individual action. By performing negative actions all at 
once, the public enmity is concentrated temporally, making it easier to ultimately placate 
the citizens and maintain good relations. In a contemporary setting, Machiavelli’s advice 
encourages leaders to pass or enforce disagreeable policies in concentration, thus 




3. Spread the benefits: As opposed to injuries, “benefits should be done little by little” 
(Machiavelli, 1988, 38). The Prince holds that leaders should spread benefits out over 
time to placate and please the population over a longer period. Spread-out benefits create 
goodwill over a sustained timespan, maintaining positive citizen-leader relations. For 
modern leaders, this means releasing positive policy breaks and news throughout their 
leadership tenure, rather than all at once. Frequency of benefits matters more than 
intensity in Machiavelli’s world. 
4. Fear the great in society: According to the Florentine theorist, “the prince must be on 
guard against [the great in the society], and fear them as if they were open enemies” 
(1988, 40). The great are the powerful and influential in a given society. Leaders should 
be worried about great persons in their society who are not obligated to the leader for 
their position. Potentially, the non-obligated persons could be ambitious and turn on the 
leader in times of adversity, undermining the leader’s position or authority for their own 
gain. Machiavelli encourages the prince to “fear them as if they were open enemies” 
(1988, 40). Contemporary leaders also should be wary of influential members of society 
according to this theory, as these great influencers could challenge a leader’s policy, 
leadership position or very authority. 
5. Breed dependency in citizenry: Machiavelli’s theory in The Prince also states that “the 
prince must think of a way by which his citizens, always and in every quality of time, 
have need of the state and of himself” (1988, 42). Essentially, leaders should craft 
dependency among the citizenry so that the people do not abandon the state in times of 
crises. A leader already depends on the citizens for their own authority. When the leader 




Ultimately, this guarantees a faithful citizenry to the prince. In modern times, this same 
principle applies, encouraging leaders to intertwine the state and its policies with the 
functioning and well-being of an individual’s everyday existence. Citizens will remain 
loyal to the state as necessary to their own well-being according to The Prince. 
6. Avoid blame, take credit: Machiavelli’s treatise holds that “princes should have anything 
blamable administered by others, favors by themselves” (1988, 75). Most simply, princes 
want direct association with positive, not negative consequences. Thus, the 
administration of policy and the subsequent attribution of responsibility are important. 
Contemporarily, this maxim can be summarized as leaders should avoid blame and take 
credit. Leaders can gain associations with positive elements and deflect negative 
associations through proper administration and communication. 
7. Maintain an environment for business: The Florentine also believes that a prince “should 
inspire his citizens to follow their [economic] pursuits” (1988, 91). A leader is 
responsible for generating an environment where individuals can carry out everyday 
activities without drastic state intervention. Citizens should not be afraid to be 
economically active. According to The Prince, this is beneficial to a leader, getting a 
satisfied and active populace, but also a more powerful and influential state through 
economic growth and trade. Contemporarily, leaders should create environments where 
economic pursuits can continue day to day, though the methodology and policy has 
changed since the Renaissance era. 
8. Entertain the people: Interestingly, Machiavelli demands that a prince “should…keep the 
people occupied with festivals and spectacles” at different times throughout the year 




goodwill from the people toward the ruler. While this was common practice among 
leaders of the day, especially with religious festivals, the act nonetheless creates a 
population that is loyal and thankful to the prince, as well as potentially distracted. 
Contemporarily, Machiavelli would also encourage leaders to entertain the populous on 
occasion, though the classical festivals like those of the Roman era are likely out-of-date. 
New leaders should use spectacles when possible, though, in order to create awe, 
distraction and thankfulness among the people. 
9. Account for diverse groups: Finally, in the domestic sphere, The Prince encourages a 
leader to “take account of those [diverse] communities [within a state and] meet with 
them sometimes” (1988, 91). Plainly, a leader should reach out to different groups within 
their state and meet with them to demonstrate humanity and interest. States are not 
homogenous, and leaders need to understand and show respect to a variety of 
backgrounds and groups. In modern society, this involves meeting with different ethnic, 
national and racial groups, as well as different political, economic and special interest 
organizations. Keeping these multitudes happy ensures a better functioning state and 
more loyalty to the leader. 
Taken together, all of these domestic policies and tactics create an image of a leader intent on 
keeping order and loyalty among the state’s population. Machiavelli’s ideal prince tries to 
control the citizenry through a variety of methods, but ultimately wants a docile, faithful and 
productive state. The Prince emphasizes that the core power of a ruler comes from the relations 
with those being ruled. A strong leader will maintain a relationship of power, respect and 
necessity where the citizens will follow the policies of a leader out of their own self-interest, but 





 While domestic policies are important, a principality or state only exists if it can maintain 
its independence and autonomy. Naturally, then, Machiavelli sought to focus some of his treatise 
on how leaders should manage foreign affairs and relations with other leaders and states. By 
properly navigating external pressures, leaders could create conditions for internal success. The 
suggestions are below. 
1. Caress or eliminate enemies: The Prince recognized that political leaders are going to 
have adversaries or enemies. According to Machiavelli, these “men should either be 
caressed or eliminated” (1988, 10). Specifically, the Florentine was discussing 
occupation strategy for conquered territory and people, but his lesson can be 
interpreted in a broader, modern sense, too. Machiavelli’s fear was retribution from 
antagonistic populations. His advice then is that when dealing with enemies, leaders 
should act so that revenge is not possible. Either act so harshly that an enemy cannot 
seek revenge or act so leniently that an enemy will not want revenge. 
2. Be the defender of lesser powers: In regard to neighboring states, Machiavelli urges a 
prince to “make himself head and defender of the neighboring lesser powers” (1988, 
11). A leader should ensure that neighboring powers are weak and dependent on the 
leader’s own state. By defending lesser powers, leaders make other states dependent 
on them so that those neighbors do not encourage invasion or attack from larger 
foreign powers. In a modern sense, allying with neighbors creates a buffer state where 
powerful foreign enemies cannot exert much influence. By defending a lesser power, 




undermining the leader’s state. Machiavelli also encourages the weakening of the 
powerful within neighboring states to increase a prince’s own influence there. 
3. Build weak enemies to crush: Perhaps counter-intuitively, the Florentine suggests that 
“A wise prince…should astutely nourish some enmity so that when he has crushed it, 
his greatness emerges the more from it” (1988, 85). Essentially, Machiavelli believes 
a leader should build up weak or false enemies that can be easily beaten in order to 
gain repute. His opinion is that princes gain notoriety and prestige when they 
overcome obstacles, so creating a weaker enemy allows a conquerable obstacle. In a 
modern sense, this can apply to foreign affairs, but also to domestic affairs where 
leaders gain repute for stifling domestic disturbances, too. Often, the portrayal of an 
enemy as stronger than actual facts indicate can make a victory reflect more 
positively on the leader, as well. 
4. Do not be neutral: Machiavelli encourages his leaders to be decisive in foreign 
affairs, stating “a prince is also esteemed when… without any hesitation he discloses 
himself in support of someone against another” (1988, 89). Simply, a leader should 
always take sides rather than remain neutral, at least when it comes to allying with 
neighboring states in conflict. Allying with a winning combatant allows for sharing in 
friendship rather than fear of invasion. Allying with a losing combatant allows for 
refuge in the event of persecution by the winning force. Remaining neutral only 
breeds distrust from both combatants. In a modern sense, this principle would likely 
extend to multi-national alliances, too. Machiavelli would not want countries near the 




5. Beware more powerful allies: On the other hand, Machiavelli also preaches caution 
when entering into alliances, especially when deciding to attack. He states, “a prince 
must beware never to associate with someone more powerful than himself so as to 
attack others, except when necessity presses” (1988, 91). A leader should avoid 
attacking in alliance with a more powerful state because after victory, the powerful 
state can control you unopposed. This is different than refusing to remain neutral 
because the prince in this instance is instigating an attack on an enemy. If a state 
needs allied forces to attack an enemy, the state is likely not strong enough to defend 
itself from the ally should the positive relationship falter. In a modern sense, this idea 
discourages joint attacks when a leader possesses a weaker force. Machiavelli wants 
to avoid giving more power to an already powerful state. Eliminating an enemy only 
shores up an ally’s power, perhaps to the detriment of the weaker state. 
In all, Machiavelli is very adamant about maintaining balance in the realm of foreign 
affairs. His view is an anarchic one, where enemies are everywhere and alliances are temporary. 
To this end, he encourages taking power when possible by eliminating enemies and breeding 
dependency among neighbors. When taking power is not possible, Machiavelli advises against 
aiding other states in their endeavors to gain power, as counterbalancing forces are necessary to 
maintaining a leader’s own stability and control over a state. 
 
Military Affairs 
 Occasionally, though, alliances fail and states must act with military force. Here, 




1. Remain resolute during a siege: According to the Florentine, “a powerful and spirited 
prince will always overcome [an attack or siege], now by giving hope to his subjects that 
the evil will not last long, now by giving them fear of the enemy’s cruelty, now by 
securing himself skillfully against those who appear to him too bold” (1988, 44). The 
Prince assigns multiple responsibilities to a leader during siege. First, they need to 
remain positive and liven the citizenry. Second, a leader should balance that positivity 
with a negative fear of the enemy, making the people more loyal to the prince. Finally, 
too, a leader needs to be wary of those within his state who will either attack rashly out of 
frustration or try to undermine authority. In modern times, siege warfare is somewhat 
outdated, but prolonged wars or battles could have similar psychological and attritional 
effects on a population as a siege. By acting steadily both during and after attacks, leaders 
will earn the trust and loyalty of their citizens and be able to pursue a war or battle to its 
completion with citizen support. 
2. Do not use foreign armies: Once war has commenced, Machiavelli advises that “a wise 
prince… has preferred to lose with his own [arms] than to win with others” (1988, 55). 
Simply, a leader should avoid enlisting aid of foreign militaries or mercenaries to win 
battles. Using other armies breeds dependency either on mercenary forces or on foreign 
aid. This undermines the capacity of state sovereignty, authority and one’s own military 
and will ultimately cause loss in the end. In modern times, mercenary forces have 
somewhat changed in form, but leaders will often still work in conjunction with foreign 
armies. Machiavelli’s tenet here may be undermined by the contemporary use of multi-
national military operations and alliances, but the underlying sentiment of using a state’s 




3. Be a military expert: Bluntly, the Florentine argues that “a prince should have no other 
object…but that of war and its orders and disciplines” (1988, 58). To Machiavelli, a 
leader, at their core, should be incredibly well-versed in military affairs, as it allows for 
the ultimate preservation of the state. The art of war is the sole art “which concerns the 
one who commands” (1988, 58). In order to command a state, both from internal and 
external threats, a prince needs to have force. The prince that ignores this focus will be 
conquered. Moreover, a prince ignorant of military affairs will not have the trust and 
respect of his forces. In modern times, this focus on military affairs could be amended to 
having defense and military be the top priority for the leader of any state. A leader 
focused on military affairs will have a significantly higher chance of succeeding in war, 
which can ultimately wipe out a nation if lost. Further, expertise in military affairs will 
garner respect and loyalty from the military establishment. 
4. Do not be idle in peace: Even when there is no war, Machiavelli stresses that leaders 
should remain prepared, saying that “a wise prince should… never remain idle in 
peaceful times” (1988, 60). A leader should actively work in peacetime to prepare for 
future conflict. By preparing during peacetime, a leader can create capacity to later wage 
war. This preparation can be a deciding factor in the ultimate conflict. Contemporarily, 
this means that military and defense forces need to be constantly vigilant and prepared for 
a multitude of deployments and possibilities. Further, training and investment must be 
taken in peacetime to increase and better a military’s capacity, choosing to fund it even 
without the threat of immediate conflict. 
5. Perform great acts: More vaguely related to military affairs is Machiavelli’s advice that 




This could be more broadly interpreted in the modern day, but for Machiavelli, he lists 
multiple examples of daring military campaigns and conquests as examples of great 
enterprises. These bold victories give a prince more power, but also reputation and 
captivation among average citizens. A bold leader will be followed more readily and an 
active leader will keep the populace occupied with these great enterprises’ outcomes, 
potentially distracting from negative aspects of rule. More broadly, Machiavelli also 
encouraged “rare examples…in governing internally,” encouraging leaders to be bold and 
captivating home and abroad (1988, 88). In a modern context, bold military expeditions 
still exist, but domestic enterprises are more frequent avenues in the more constrained 
international context. 
Overall, Machiavelli’s military advice revolves around reputation and capacity. First, a 
leader has to command an effective military that is always prepared and can stand on its own 
against a multitude of forces. The leader’s own expertise is imperative to maintaining 
effectiveness in the troops, but it also generates loyalty and repute. The Prince urges leaders 
to have a great military reputation in order to maintain respect from the military and 
citizenry, but also to create a positive and admiring public that is focused on a leader’s 
military adventures. An active and public leader will be lauded by both citizens and military 
alike, gaining more power both through conquest and reputation. 
 
Personal Conduct and Image 
 More than just policy and actions though, leaders are also judged by their personal 




morality. The application of Machiavellian conduct expresses itself in foreign, military and 
domestic affairs and the particulars are detailed below. 
1. Appear great: Machiavelli urges leaders to keep up appearances, stating that a prince 
“should contrive that greatness, spiritedness, gravity and strength are recognized in his 
actions” (1988, 72). As in military enterprises, leaders should aspire to be personally seen 
as embodiments of their great acts. Personal conduct readily affects public perception. A 
leader needs their citizens and their advisors to admire the leader, gaining loyalty through 
honor and respect. Machiavelli sums up that a leader who appears great in the public eye 
will have “no one [who] thinks either of deceiving him or of getting around him” (1988, 
72). In modern leadership, Machiavelli would likely want leaders to cultivate their self-
image of grandeur, maintaining notoriety and repute among the general population. This 
idealization will further entrench a leader’s power. 
2. Read history: To maintain power, though, the Florentine urges that “a prince should read 
histories and consider in them the actions of excellent men” in order to emulate them 
(1988, 60). Machiavelli spends significant portions of his treatise analyzing historical 
leaders, so naturally, he suggests modern leaders study the mistakes and success of the 
past. This learning can easily be used to guide action as many lessons apply to leadership 
in a universal context. Fittingly, Machiavelli’s advice to Renaissance princes applies to 
modern leaders, too. A contemporary leader should be well read and understand historical 
successes and failures in order to emulate the victories and avoid the shortcomings.  
3. Avoid public vices: While Machiavelli urges a prince to appear great in public, the 
opposite is also true and “it is necessary for him… to avoid the infamy of those vices that 




traits that are generally held in a negative light, but he admits that it would be impossible 
to “wholly observe” their opposite, positive traits (1988, 62). Instead he focuses on 
princes avoiding a reputation for any particularly negative traits, which he describes in 
detail in later sections. Overall, this concept translates almost directly to modern times, in 
that a leader should avoid demonstrating vices, at least publicly, that could jeopardize 
their repute among the citizens and thus jeopardize power over the state. 
4. Infamy for vices can be necessary: However, The Prince does not shy away from using 
vices when needed, and Machiavelli has become synonymous with the advice “one 
should not care about incurring the fame of those vices without which it is difficult to 
save one’s state” (1998, 62). Simply, Machiavelli urges that in dire straits, leaders must 
do what is necessary to preserve their state, regardless of their infamy. More succinctly, 
the ends can justify the means. Machiavelli urges, “do not depart from good, when 
possible, but know how to enter into evil when forced by necessity” (1988, 70). Avoiding 
infamy for vices and performing evil itself are secondary to maintaining control, 
authority and order. This applies more subtly to modern leaders, who should not worry 
about gaining a reputation for certain negative attributes if they lead to increased state 
security and continuing maintenance of power. 
5. Be frugal: After outlining the occasional need for acting with vices for the maintenance 
of power and the state, Machiavelli lists the vices that are sometimes necessary. To start, 
he advises that princes “should not…care about a name for meanness” (1988, 63). In this 
instance, The Prince refers to being frugal with money and spending. A leader cannot be 
liberal with money on public or private spending and still maintain proper fiscal reserves 




vice, meanness and parsimony help “enable [a prince] to rule” (1988, 64). In modern 
contexts, a reputation for parsimony is not a detractor, but rather is a sign of good fiscal 
responsibility and preparedness. 
6. Do not be hated:  As a caveat to all of the use of vices, Machiavelli insists that “a prince 
should guard against being contemptible and hated” (1988, 65). Hatred leads to 
retribution and instability, the opposite of a prince’s desired stable order. Machiavelli 
worries in particular that financial imprudence can garner hatred for the leader among the 
population, reinforcing his call for meanness. Contemporarily, a leader needs to avoid 
outright hatred of the citizens, because that will ultimately lead to dismissal from rule. 
7. Be cruel when necessary for order:  Machiavelli continues to argue in favor of occasional 
vices in personal conduct when describing cruelty. Though it is to be avoided if possible, 
he argues that a prince “should not care about the infamy of cruelty” because it will often 
be “more merciful” than “allow[ing] disorders to continue” (1988, 65). Machiavelli 
claims that occasional cruelty to establish order can ultimately be what is best for a state 
and its inhabitants. Order is safer than chaos and better in the long term for the citizens, 
the state and the power of the prince. In a modern sense, using cruelty probably is more 
loosely defined as harsh measures and force in order to stifle disorder and maintain 
authority. However, these vices remain last resorts. 
8. Be feared: In order to remain effective in using vices, a prince needs to keep a population 
loyal. To this end, Machiavelli advises that “the prince should nonetheless make himself 
feared in such a mode that if he does not acquire love, he escapes hatred” (1988, 67) A 
leader should try to be feared and loved, but fear is safer. According to The Prince, in 




held by fear. Again, it is important that a prince’s personal character be formidable, 
creating an infamy and reputation that engenders loyalty and respect, even in the hardest 
moments. This creation of a persona of fear must be tempered by the avoidance of hate, 
though. For a modern leader, the importance of being feared is limited by the powers of 
an executive. However, fear of authority does continue to garner respect, order and 
adherence to the state. 
9. Be clever and strong: With the element of fear, though, comes the added importance of 
intelligence. As Machiavelli describes in metaphor, “one needs to be a fox to recognize 
snares and a lion to frighten wolves” (1988, 69). Here he holds that a leader should be 
both clever and strong, using trickery and force as needed. The analogy of the fox is one 
of cleverness, slyness and observation while the lion emanates power and generates fear. 
Machiavelli wants his leaders to have both elements present, with each element 
supporting the other. The metaphor extends almost directly to modern contexts, where 
cleverness and strength are both wanted in a contemporary leader. 
10. Prepare to break promises: A clever leader, according to Machiavelli, will recognize that 
lying and breaking promises are sometimes necessary, saying “a prudent lord… cannot 
observe faith…when such observance turns against him” (1988, 69). Succinctly, a leader 
should keep his word only as far as it is prudent. Machiavelli holds this as a necessity 
because he claims men are not trustworthy. If keeping a pact or a promise will result in 
the unsettling of the state, a leader should break their word. The same applies to a modern 
leader where pacts should be broken if necessity requires. 
11. Appear virtuous: While Machiavelli has advised princes to act in perhaps unseemly ways, 




(1988, 70). Citizens want leaders they can admire, at least superficially. To Machiavelli, 
then, a leader must appear to be full of positive virtues, namely being “merciful, faithful, 
humane, honest and religious” in the eyes of the general public (1988, 70). The adherence 
to these virtues is not important, except for maintaining goodwill among the members of 
the state. For any contemporary leader, appearances and adherence to societal standards 
of virtue continue to matter in much the same way. 
12. Pick good advisors: Ultimately, Machiavelli recognizes that a prince’s personal conduct 
is not enough to maintain a state, and that an advisory inner circle is necessary. The 
Florentine has two-fold advice with advisors. First, he insists that “a prince should think 
of the minister so as to keep him good” (1988, 94). Simply, a leader needs to be mindful 
of his advisors’ intelligence and ambition, honoring them and making them dependent on 
the leader’s power and support. This awareness can help consolidate and maintain power 
for a leader. Secondly, Machiavelli wants good advisors, stating that “a prudent prince 
must… choos[e] wise men in his state; and only to these should he give freedom to speak 
the truth to him” (1988, 94). A leader needs to have wise advisors in order to increase the 
collective information and decision making capability of the state. This is especially true 
of modern leaders with significantly larger and more complex states. Leaders need to 
keep their advisors in check, but they must make sure that the best and brightest are in the 
room. 
13. Take counsel when wanted, but take it well: Machiavelli finally and fittingly advises a 
prince on how to take advice from an inner circle. First, he requires that “a prince… 
should always take counsel, but when he wants” (1988, 95). This keeps ultimate authority 




of what is important. The power and direction of the state remains in the hands of the 
leader. However, to rightly direct the state, the leader “should be a very broad questioner, 
and… a patient listener to the truth” (1988, 95). To fully gauge the needs of a state, a 
leader should be curious and engaged on many topics. Most importantly, Machiavelli 
coyly suggests that princes accept truth when they recognize a valid argument. For 
contemporary leadership, this advice stresses empiricism and accepting of potentially 
unwanted conclusions in order to best understand and react to the needs of the state. 
In all, Machiavelli’s advice for a leader’s personal conduct is seen as contradictory to many 
traditional models of leadership. The conduct of a Machiavellian prince is one that relies on 
appearing traditional, but breaking from those norms when necessity beckons. Ultimately, a 
leader’s persona and conduct should generate loyalty and fear, as adoration often means little in 
times of strife according to the Florentine. Machiavelli’s final advice, though, is to heed good 
advice, urging the keeping of wise counselors around the prince who can offer guidance on 
matters of personal conduct and beyond. Perhaps implicitly, Machiavelli is urging leaders to 
listen to his own advice. 
 
Applied Theory: Stalin 
Machiavelli’s direct influences on Joseph Stalin are not clear, nor are they particularly 
important for this thesis. Robert Service, the historian, claims that Stalin both read The Prince 
and “annotated and owned his own copy of it” (2005, 343). However, the copy no longer exists 
in the archives, casting uncertainty on his true relationship with the treatise. What matters is how 




 Though Stalin held many different positions in Soviet leadership before and after the 
Russian revolution, by the late 1920s and early 1930s, he had managed to consolidate power to 
the extent that he “had become the dictator of the USSR in all but name” (Service, 2005, 287). 
This authoritarian executive rule would continue throughout WWII and expressed itself in 
Stalin’s foreign affairs, military choices, domestic policies and personal conduct. In his 
ruthlessness, Stalin’s decisions and choices mirrored a Machiavellian prince. However, his lack 
of understanding and cunning in many aspects of foreign and military affairs, especially at the 
beginning of the war, demonstrated a deviation from The Prince’s framework. 
 
Foreign Affairs 
In foreign policy choices especially, the Soviet leader sometimes fell short of the 
Florentine’s ideal. Naturally, his policy relations chiefly concerned the two main powers of the 
war, the German-led Axis powers and the opposed Allied powers. However, Stalin’s foreign 
relations with these powers in the buildup and conduct of war proved erratic, both insightful at 
times and ignorant at others. Regardless of the foreign policy outcomes, Stalin’s policy choices 
occasionally, and meaningfully, diverged from Machiavelli’s tenets. 
Most notoriously, as war neared in the late summer of 1939, Stalin chose to create an 
alliance with Hitler and Nazi Germany. During the preceding years, Germany had begun 
territorial expansion in Europe through annexation and appeasement. France and Britain 
provided particularly stout and vocal opposition to these actions, furthering an already volatile 
international political divide. With Hitler likely to invade Poland, Stalin and the USSR were 
faced with a security decision. The Soviets could side with Germany or the Allied powers of 




to Stalin and Moscow with the intent of forming a security pact. Ultimately, on August 23, 1939, 
Stalin signed a non-aggression pact with Germany (Conquest, 1991, 219-21). 
 This decision is controversial with its relation to a Machiavellian framework on foreign 
relations. On the one hand, The Prince urged leaders to not be neutral (1988, 89). Clearly, Stalin 
did not intend to remain on the sidelines of the impending world war, and he was torn between 
declaring security agreements with Germany or the Allied cause. He did, however, take a side, 
entering into alliance with Hitler. In Machiavellian terms, this makes sense, as Stalin avoided 
having both sets of belligerents being distrustful of the USSR. Instead, he aligned with at least 
one force, with the expectation of peace between the Soviets and the Nazis, even if that created 
enmity with Britain and France. His decision to ally with Germany, though, may have been ill-
advised according to Machiavellian principles. 
While the Florentine discouraged neutrality in conflict, he also warned against more 
powerful allies. Specifically, he said a leader “must beware never to associate with someone 
more powerful than himself so as to attack others, except when necessity presses” (91). As 
Hitler’s later advances show, Germany was a significantly more industrialized and militarized 
society than the USSR. In isolation, Machiavellian tenets suggest that Stalin’s association with 
Germany was ill-advised. By attacking in conjunction with a powerful ally, a check and balance 
on the power of the ally is removed. Yet, Stalin’s non-aggression pact enabled the eventual joint-
invasion of Poland (Conquest, 1991, 222). In the selection of alliances, Stalin chose the more 
expansionist and bellicose side, almost guaranteeing the USSR’s involvement in a joint attack.  
The German alliance ultimately weakened Soviet defenses and standing while also 
emboldening and empowering Germany. Further, it violated another Machiavellian tenet to be 




immediately swore off any claims as a potential defender of neighboring Poland. In an alliance 
with the British and French, the Soviets would have been joint allies against German intrusion 
into Poland. In Machiavelli’s rhetoric, this created multiple benefits for the protector state. First, 
Polish dependence created a larger Soviet sphere of influence and earned goodwill. Second, 
pledged defense discouraged expansion by other powerful states, like Germany. Finally, 
maintaining the territorial integrity of Poland ensured the existence of buffers between the USSR 
and Germany. Stalin instead allied with Germany, expanding jointly into Poland and the Baltic 
states as discussed in more detail later. 
In isolation, these actions seem distinctly at odds with The Prince. In context, though, 
Stalin probably followed Machiavelli’s overarching advice to do whatever is necessary to 
preserve the state. The Soviet leader was not acting in isolation, but rather on the cusp of a world 
war. The imminence of German military action may have forced Stalin’s hand in joining the 
alliance. The non-aggression pact provided temporary peace with Germany, as well as the 
promise of Soviet expansion. Yes, Machiavelli explicitly warns against the use of alliances for 
expanding territory and influence, with the caveat of “except when necessity presses” (1988, 91). 
Yes, Stalin certainly entered into an alliance with a more powerful ally that in turn helped 
eliminate a buffer between Germany and the USSR. However, this decision may have been 
forced by “necessity.” As Conquest notes, Stalin had to choose between a security arrangement 
with Germany or the Anglo-French alliance. Yet the “collective security” of France and Britain 
“might not deter Hitler” and instead could have led to “Soviet involvement in an uncertain war” 
(1991, 221). A German alliance, though, allowed the USSR to continue improving its military 




Hitler would give Stalin a period of respite” (Service, 2005, 401). Stalin chose the Machiavellian 
path of survival at all costs. 
Ultimately, Stalin’s decision to enter into a non-aggression pact with Hitler marked some 
divergence from a Machiavellian prince in outright theory, namely in the decision to ally with a 
more powerful state and attack a weaker state. However, in practice, Machiavelli urged acting 
out of necessity in order to preserve the state. Through a non-aggression pact, Stalin bought his 
country and military nearly two years to prepare for future conflict. Here, though, Stalin’s largest 
aberration from Machiavellian action in foreign affairs occurred. Despite the initial actions to 
delay war, the Soviet leader failed to adequately take advantage of peace time, and Stalin’s 
ignorance and lack of preparedness for Hitler’s betrayal in 1941 left his country in a dangerous 
situation. 
Germany initiated Operation Barbarossa, its attack on the Soviet Union, in June of 1941. 
However, planning and operational logistics had been going on for months prior to the invasion. 
Germany clearly was “concentrating troops in Poland,” though Hitler was evasive on their 
purpose. Further, Germans began “reconnaissance overflights of Soviet territory” (Conquest, 
1991, 234-5). Yet, throughout the build-up, Stalin remained indecisive. He did declare to some 
military leaders that war was possible, but conversely the Soviet leader refused to accept the 
validity of intelligence reports indicating German plans of attack. Instead, he became the “sole 
arbiter” of information and attempted to understand Hitler’s intentions. He took “a massive 
gamble with his country’s security,” and the gamble failed (Service, 2005, 412). Hitler did 
invade, and the Soviets were caught unprepared. 
From a Machiavellian perspective, Stalin failed, too. The lack of military preparation will 




personal conduct. Stalin completely failed to gather and heed good advisors. The Prince 
demands that good leaders bring “wise men” or advisors for counsel and that the leader should 
“be a patient listener to truth,” meaning accepting of truthful advice or information (1988, 95). 
Under a Machiavellian framework, Stalin should have had a diverse set of intelligence reports on 
German actions and movements that were then reviewed and debated by an intelligent and 
diverse set of advisors and colleagues. Instead, Stalin had sycophants. When he received reports, 
he chalked them up to British misinformation or urged his intelligence chiefs to reach the same 
conclusion. He alone processed information, “prevent[ing] alternative counsels being put 
forward” (Conquest, 1991, 234). This is a direct divergence from the advice of The Prince, with 
its insistence on having a wise group of advisors and remaining receptive to good counsel. Stalin 
lacked good advisors and did not listen when truthful information or advice came to him. 
Overall, Stalin’s foreign policy before the war did not strictly adhere to a Machiavellian 
framework, and often diverged significantly from what The Prince demanded of its ideal leader. 
His showing in Allied relations, discussed later, proved more Machiavellian, but his initial forays 
into international diplomacy were generally not in line with the Florentine’s thinking.  
 
Military Affairs 
 Following the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact, Stalin properly dictated military affairs, 
rather than solely foreign diplomacy. In military strategy, specifically his preparation for Hitler’s 
invasion and the Winter War, Stalin fell short of the cunning and expertise expected of a 
Machiavellian leader. However, with ruthlessness and determination, Stalin somewhat matched 





 Following Germany’s attack on Poland, the Soviet forces also mobilized and attacked 
from the east, quickly dismantling a strained and overmatched Polish force. Soon after, Stalin 
forced Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia to allow entry of Soviet regiments, essentially annexing the 
countries under a military sphere of influence while expanding the USSR’s buffer. This initial 
burst of military expansion on the Polish and Baltic fronts at the start of WWII was finalized by 
Stalin’s treatment of Polish POWs. Ruthlessly and disturbingly, Stalin ordered the massacre of 
“about 15,000 Polish officers and others” at Katyn in Poland (Conquest, 1991, 229). 
 Though horrific, these various acts do follow a literal interpretation of a Machiavellian 
framework. Most explicitly, The Prince argues that “men should either be caressed or 
eliminated” in reference to potential enemies in occupied territory (10). In his murdering of 
surrendered combatants, Stalin followed Machiavelli’s advice nearly verbatim. While the 
Florentine might have urged restraint because of potential international repercussions, there is no 
doubt that the execution of POWs falls under the scope of his original dictum. The Prince 
chillingly states that men want to avenge themselves for “offenses but cannot do so for grave 
ones,” like death (1988, 10). More plainly, men want revenge for wrongs against them, but if the 
wrong is severe enough, such as massacre and elimination, no one is capable of taking revenge. 
Stalin eliminated potential enemies, ensuring that the Polish officers could not rebel against the 
Soviet occupiers in the future. This might not have been the best tactic according to Machiavelli, 
but it certainly was a tactical choice suggested by his writings.  
More broadly, Machiavelli urges leaders to “carry on great enterprises,” specifically in 
reference to military campaigns (1988, 87). Stalin’s expansion into Poland and the Baltic states 
qualified as such an enterprise, using military force and intimidation to expand the power and 




Though continuing on the same Machiavellian thread of crushing enemies and carrying out great 
enterprises, the Winter War, as the conflict would be come to be called, also showed some of 
Stalin’s shortcomings as a Machiavellian leader. With the goal of obtaining more territory, 
creating a buffer for Leningrad, and obtaining more naval bases, Stalin attacked Finland in late 
November 1939. Though expecting a short war of “ten or twelve days,” the conflict raged for 
months with little progress and considerably higher losses than expected. Eventually, peace 
terms gained Soviets the territory they had sought in earlier negotiations, but at the cost of 
demonstrating military weakness (Conquest, 1991, 228). 
Though he followed the dictum to embark on great enterprises, Stalin violated one of 
Machiavelli’s most emphasized tenets of executive leadership in his invasion of Finland. 
Succinctly, the Florentine writes that “a prince should have no other object… but that of war and 
its orders and disciplines” (1988, 58). The Prince requires leaders to be students of military 
strategy and focused on military expertise. Here, Stalin failed miserably. He grossly 
miscalculated the capacity of his own troops, and relied on his own shoddy military experience 
to determine broad strategy (Conquest, 1991, 228). Though he believed himself to be an expert 
of war, Stalin’s strategy showed him to be deficient in his understanding of military affairs. 
 The Machiavellian shortcomings of the Winter War were evident again in the preparation 
and response to the German invasion. As noted earlier, Germany offered clear signs of an 
impending attack, ranging from troop movements to intercepted communications. However, 
Stalin refused to counter-mobilize Soviet troops or prepare them explicitly for an invasion. 
According to Conquest, “even the most elementary orders for combat readiness only reached 
some of the troops after the war had already started.” Moreover, Stalin had no plan for war, had 




To make matters worse, Stalin had gutted the military leadership in the buildup to war as 
part of a larger societal purge. Between 1937 and 1938, Stalin oversaw a decimation of the 
creative talent and experienced leadership in the Red Army. In order to gain more authority and 
power, he rigged a military court to order the execution of the Army’s top commanders. This set 
off further executions and arrests that would lead to the discharge of “approximately 35,000 
military leaders” (Whitewood, 2015, 1). With the invasion of Germany, the effects of the purge 
of the Red Army became readily apparent. Few to no officers had sufficient military training or 
experience at the start of the conflict, furthering confusion and ineffectiveness despite numerical 
advantages over the Germans. The Nazis quickly overwhelmed initial defensive resistance 
(Conquest, 1991, 236-7). 
 Stalin here diverges significantly from an ideal Machiavellian leader. Notably, in the case 
of the Red Army purge, he completely undercut his capacity to be an expert in war. For example, 
General Staff officers at the time were expected to have twelve to twenty years of training. In the 
purge, these officers “were almost all annihilated” (Conquest, 1991, 201).  By eliminating most 
veteran and trained officers, he gutted the experience and institutional knowledge of the military. 
That is information that he also should have relied on to learn and grow as a commander. 
Without the military experts to advise, teach and challenge him, Stalin could not truly make “war 
and its orders and disciplines” his “art;” he tied his own hands (Machiavelli, 1988, 58). Beyond 
that, Stalin failed to follow Machiavelli’s guidelines in making use of peace time for the 
preparation for war. The Prince argues to “never remain idle in peaceful times,” yet Stalin 
refused to prepare his military for war (1988, 60). His army was out of position, surprised, 




Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact, but the interim time was not used effectively as evidenced by 
the massive Nazi gains in the early months of the war.  
 The German troops continued to penetrate deep into Soviet territory in the fall of 1941, 
and “by mid-October the Germans were at the gates of Moscow” (Conquest, 1991, 248).  Their 
proximity threw Stalin and the capital into a panic. Key government documents were burned, and 
high ranking officials began evacuating. Stalin had plans to follow soon after, with a train ready 
for him. However, “at the last moment,” Stalin changed his mind and stayed (Service, 2005, 
420). According to Conquest, Stalin understood that “his leaving Moscow would be a severe 
moral defeat,” opting instead to take the symbolic risk of remaining in the capital (1991, 249). 
 Here, Stalin could not have acted in a more Machiavellian mode. The siege of Moscow is 
a rough analogue to the traditional sieges of city-states common at the time of The Prince’s 
writing. Moscow was surrounded, the population forced into city from the countryside, the 
military holding a thin barrier of defense while an enemy destroyed much in their path. In such a 
situation, Stalin acted just as a Machiavelli suggests a leader should. First, despite his initial 
shock at the outbreak of war, Stalin responded to the direct assault on Moscow in the “powerful 
and spirited” manner Machiavelli demands (1988, 44). By staying in the capital, unlike the 
French government for instance, Stalin was “giving hope to his subjects,” directly as The Prince 
advises (1988, 44). Stalin was a symbol of both the political and military might of the USSR. 
Continuation of a military parade in November and a “strong and effective speech” inside an air-
raid raid shelter converted from a Metro station offered further evidence of Stalin’s resolute 
capacity in the face of siege (Conquest, 1991, 249). His actions importantly underlined the desire 




Machiavellian logic counselled leadership strength in siege in order to breed further dependency 
and loyalty of the people, and Stalin followed through. 
 If Moscow was Stalin’s strategic stroke of genius, his general military conduct offered 
sobering contrast. When German troops were overwhelming the Soviets in Ukraine, Stalin’s 
generals advised him to pull troops from the capital to save resources and fight another day. But 
the Soviet leader ordered the troops to stay in Kiev, leading to the “greatest single defeat of the 
war” and the capture of “half a million prisoners” (Conquest, 1991, 240). In the condemning 
words of Service, Stalin “acted like a military ignoramus, just as he had proved a diplomatic 
one” (2005, 421). Throughout the war, Stalin would continue to be headstrong in similar ways, 
often overruling his generals and military intelligence officers, to the detriment of troops on the 
ground. Though he did improve as the war progressed, his initial blunders and general ego 
caused significant damage to the Soviet army and population. Despite ultimately defeating the 
Germans, the USSR suffered “four to eight times” the losses of their Nazi counterparts. In 
Conquest’s quick summation, the war “might have been won more easily but for [Stalin’s] 
mistakes both before and during the struggle” (1991, 266). 
 As was discussed in the failed preparations for the initial Nazi invasion, Machiavelli 
demands that a leader understand war. Stalin frequently and dangerously overestimated his own 
mastery of this “art” (Machiavelli, 1988, 58). In doing so, he costs many Soviet lives while also 
ignoring a key Machiavellian tenet. This was far from the cunning leader that The Prince 
desired. Yet, to an outside observer, the callousness toward and negligence of the lives of 
individuals could almost be seen as cruel. With this interpretation, Stalin comes back toward 
fulfilling Machiavellian expectations. Despite millions of casualties, the Soviet leader ordered 




with sheer force of will. He did what was necessary to “preserve one’s state,” regardless of the 
effects on his reputation or people (Machiavelli, 1988, 62). He sacrificed lives for the 
maintenance and power of the state and was victorious, just as Machiavelli would have advised. 
 In all, Stalin’s military affairs serve as a large deviation from The Prince’s expectations 
of a cunning, military expert as leader. Instead, Stalin’s military power ultimately comes from 
his ruthlessness in the defeat of the enemy, even at the astronomical costs to his own soldiers and 
people. This too, is Machiavellian, and Stalin’s partial adherence to the framework stems largely 
from his sheer force of will. He wanted to preserve the state and used any means necessary and 
any lives necessary to reach that end. The result was victory, but at high cost. 
 
Domestic Affairs 
 Stalin’s domestic affairs were largely limited during the war, as much of his attention and 
energy went in to the actual operations of fighting. Likewise, the home-front was 
overwhelmingly dedicated to the war effort. However, a key conflict did emerge in domestic 
policy, and Stalin responded in a tactically Machiavellian fashion, though his strategic analysis 
was tinged with paranoia rather than cunning. 
 Stalin’s regime had long been active in the deportation or purging of dissident groups 
within the Soviet Union. Despite the massive war effort, Stalin decided to continue this 
aggressive and abusive domestic policy in 1943, focusing his effort on certain nationalities in the 
Caucuses. Eventually, some two million people were rounded up and sent to labor camps in 
Siberia and Central Asia. “About a third of them died” within the first few months of initial 
arrest (Conquest, 1991, 258-9). For the survivors, Stalin assigned nearly 100,000 secret police 




in the region and eliminated the political entities granting any sort of autonomy, further 
consolidating his rule (Conquest, 1991, 258). 
 During the war itself, no other act so stands out as exemplary of the ruthless advice of 
The Prince. Obviously, Machiavelli calls on a good leader to eliminate enemies if they cannot be 
caressed into submission (1988, 10). Operating in a Russian-dominated state, Stalin decided to 
crush the non-Russian nationalities in the Caucus region, eliminating enemies in order to better 
control the area, just as the Florentine would have prescribed. In the same vein, Stalin opted to 
use force when he deemed it necessary to create support for his regime. As Machiavelli phrases 
the same concept, “one can make them believe by force” (1988, 24). Obviously, force has its 
drawbacks, often sowing discontent among the population. Yet, Stalin used a Machiavellian 
framework to avoid that eventuality. The Soviet leader followed the advice that “injuries must be 
done all together” so that “tasted less, they offend less” (Machiavelli, 1988, 38). He took two 
million people at once, numbing the effects of each individual arrest with the grand and quick 
scale of the action. The Florentine would have suggested the same course of action. Naturally, 
Stalin’s domestic conduct during the war was largely limited, but its few instances offered sharp 
reminders why Machiavelli and Stalin are often associated with ruthless policies designed to 
maintain power. 
 On the other hand, though, the deportation of the Caucus region was an unnecessary 
move and reflected Stalin’s paranoia about attempts to remove him from power. In the midst of 
the war, the domestic populations of the Caucus nations were not a strategic priority. Yet, by 
catering to his fears, Stalin removed 100,000 able-bodied men from the fight against the 
Germans, instead using them and enormous quantities of resources to imprison his own citizens. 




(Conquest, 1991, 259). Machiavelli makes clear that war should be a leader’s sole focus 
especially in the midst of a conflict, yet in the case of the Caucus region, Stalin was distracted 
and hindered the Soviet capacity to respond. His unfounded fears hurt the war cause, shifting 
away from Machiavelli’s desired cunning and military expertise. 
 
Ultimately, Stalin was not a perfect Machiavellian leader. Despite the conflation of his 
name and ruthlessness, he possessed far less of the cunning demanded by The Prince. His grasp 
of military affairs in particular, left much to be desired, especially in such a large-scale war.  
However, Machiavelli’s ideal leader was both a fox and a lion. While Stalin may have lacked 
some of the clever qualities of the fox, he made up for it with ruthlessness and force of will. 
Stalin was not a strategic or policy genius, but he was incredibly adept at maintaining power and 
influence, particularly through banishment, imprisonment and execution. This indicated both an 
awareness depicted in the fox metaphor as well as a capacity to handle enemies through brute 
force. Overall, though, Stalin’s most Machiavellian attribute may have been his sheer force of 
will. His willingness to use strength, particularly police and military strength, to impose his will, 
demonstrated an uncompromising desire to control and maintain the state and his own standing 
within it. While Stalin as a whole fell short of a Machiavellian ideal, his willingness to hold 
power through any means matched The Prince’s ambition.  
 
Applied Theory: Churchill 
As with Stalin, Machiavelli’s direct connection and influences on Churchill are unclear. 
Regardless, though, Churchill acted as a significantly more Machiavellian leader than Stalin in 




Churchill was a much more competent and Machiavellian leader than his Soviet counterpart. 
Where Churchill fell short of The Prince’s ideal is in domestic affairs, failing to maintain his 
own power and support in the waning days of the war. Churchill was Machiavellian insofar as he 
maintained the security of the state in the face of an existential threat. However, he failed to heed 
the Florentine’s guidance on the home-front, losing his own power domestically at the close of 
the war. 
Churchill’s initial rise to executive power occurred after the initial outbreak of World 
War II. Despite nearly forty years in Parliament, Churchill had never held the premiership until 
May 1940. In a normal political situation, he likely would not have become Prime Minister at all. 
He was not the leader of his own party, which was in power, nor the leader of the opposition 
power. Further, assuming a change in leadership, Churchill was “by no means the clear public 
choice for Prime Minister,” either (Jenkins, 2001, 576). Beyond that, he “was not the choice of 
the King… the Whitehall establishment… [nor] the choice of the majority party in the House of 
Commons” (Jenkins, 2001, 588). Yet, he would take power over a government of national unity.  
Importantly, Machiavelli recognized fortune and chance’s role in political affairs and 
history. He also recognized that the best man “adapts his mode of proceedings to the qualities of 
the times,” preparing for and taking advantage of chance, metaphorically building dams in 
anticipation for future floods (Machiavelli, 1988, 98-9). In his rise to the premiership, Churchill 
took advantage of circumstance parlayed with his long career of public service. He was the right 
man for the right time. On domestic, foreign and military fronts, Churchill seized the moment. 
Ultimately, in defending Great Britain against Nazi forces, he would employ many 






 When Churchill took the reins of the newly formed government of national unity, Europe 
had been at war for nearly a year. The German blitzkrieg on France was days old when he 
assumed the mantle of the “champion of the nation in the eyes of both the public and the press” 
(Jenkins, 2001, 588). His first and most pressing foreign affairs concern were relations with the 
distressed France. More directly, Churchill had to handle the potential landmine of a separate 
French ceasefire with the Nazi attackers, which would leave Britain alone in the Western 
European theater. Churchill desperately wanted France to continue to fight against Germany, 
regardless of the increasingly dire situation. However, with a powerful German breakthrough 
splitting the Allied lines, eventual French defeat seemed likely. By mid-June, the French 
leadership was looking to sue for a separate peace. In a last desperate attempt, Churchill, his 
cabinet, and a number of key French leaders, including Charles de Gaulle, proposed the radical 
move of “amalgamating the British and French states,” in order to fully bond their union and 
keep the French fighting, especially at sea and in North Africa (Jenkins, 2001, 619). The motion 
failed in the French cabinet, and following the French prime minister’s resignation, the new 
French cabinet sued for armistice terms with Germany. 
 Churchill’s strategy here, radical tactics aside, is largely Machiavellian. The 
Englishman’s driving theme is that France cannot remove itself from the conflict. As The Prince 
advises, a leader and a state should not remain neutral in a conflict (1988, 89).  However, 
France’s decision to sue for a ceasefire took it out of the direct struggle between Nazi Germany 
and the rest of Europe. France was an ally of Britain and an extension of British power and 
influence; thus, Churchill vehemently opposed this move toward neutrality. Moreover, Churchill 




the Machiavellian tenet of associating with more powerful states (Machiavelli, 1988, 91). 
France’s actions directly violated The Prince, and as the closest ally of the French, Churchill was 
strongly opposed to this course of action. He understood that ceasefire and acquiescence would 
only strengthen Germany. Militarily and realistically, the British needed an active and armed 
France for their own protection, too. Without a French distraction, German forces could turn 
their attention to the British Isles. Churchill’s military acumen and understanding of the 
situation, then, also followed a Machiavellian logic. The Florentine wanted a leader to “make 
himself head and defender of the neighboring lesser powers” (1988, 11). While France was not 
necessarily a lesser power, the sentiment still mattered, as Machiavelli encouraged defense of 
neighbors for both loyalty and buffer effects. Churchill needed a fighting and allied France in 
order to maintain that buffer. His efforts to keep France in the war followed a clear 
Machiavellian logic. 
 Churchill’s own decision for Britain to remain in the war and continue fighting alone also 
was clearly Machiavellian. At the time of the French ceasefire, no other major powers remained 
to oppose Germany save Great Britain. By the June of 1940, Italy was a German ally, Hitler and 
Stalin had signed a non-aggression pact, and the United States remained a year and half away 
from declaring war. However, despite these obstacles and a realistic path toward a negotiated 
peace, the Prime Minister remained adamant with his long held stance: “Whatever the French 
did, we would continue to fight to the last” (qtd. in Jenkins, 2001, 594).  
 At the very start of his premiership, Churchill delivered some of his most well-known 
and effective war-time rhetoric, clearly outlining his willingness to continue the fight. He offered 
the nation and the world his “blood, toil, tears and sweat” (qtd. in Jenkins, 2001, 591). The Prime 




however long and hard the road may be; for without victory, there is no survival” (qtd. in 
Jenkins, 2001, 591). These words, and others, would serve as rallying cry during the later Battle 
of Britain. With his words, Churchill mimicked a Machiavellian line of thought, understanding 
the importance of maintaining political sovereignty, regardless of the potential costs.  
 As with his admonishment of the French ceasefire, Churchill understood that he could not 
remain neutral in the conflict. The Machiavellian justification was similar to what Churchill 
might have said. Quoting a Roman, The Prince claims that, as a neutral party, “without thanks, 
without honor, [the neutral party] will be the prize of the victor” (1988, 90). Churchill agreed, 
knowing that if he sued for peace in 1940, he would eventually have been Hitler’s prize. Perhaps 
most importantly, Churchill understood the stakes of the historical moment, which aligned well 
with the Florentine’s major theme.  The central thesis of The Prince is Machiavelli’s depiction of 
how states, in his case principalities, are to be “governed and maintained” (1988, 6). Survival is 
the most important. Nothing would be less Machiavellian than actions leading to the ultimate 
demise of the state. Churchill, quite rightly, considered the war with Germany to be a matter of 
survival (Neillands, 2003, 147). Only continued fighting gave Britain a chance at national 
survival. So, Churchill continued to fight, as Machiavelli would have advised. 
 While remaining in the war was a foreign affairs decision, it had an important domestic 
component. Just as members of the French cabinet had considered and ultimately sued for peace, 
likewise some members of the British government were somewhat open to negotiating a peace 
with Germany. The most important potential agitator for appeasement and peace was Lord 
Halifax, the Foreign Secretary of Churchill’s new cabinet. He wanted “to preserve as much as he 
could of the England he knew and loved,” perhaps hoping for a neutral independence beyond the 




Great Britain had the resources to withstand an assault from Nazi attackers. Churchill handled 
the situation skillfully, and frankly, in a way Machiavelli would have counselled. 
 First, Churchill recognized the fragility of the political situation. If Halifax went public 
about his desire to sue for peace, along with another cabinet ally, likely the recently unseated 
Chamberlin, Churchill’s still novel and tenuous power would have been largely undermined. Yet 
Churchill was clever and alert, playing Machiavelli’s fox, “recogniz[ing] snares” (Machiavelli, 
1988, 69). He knew the present risks and acted accordingly to mitigate them. He did this through 
Machiavellian means, too. Churchill remained clever and worked through three days of 
argumentation to convince Halifax and Neville Chamberlin, the former Prime Minister who still 
commanded massive respect in the party, that war was the only logical course. Where logos may 
have failed, Churchill also turned to ethos, following the Machiavellian advice to have 
“greatness, spiritedness, gravity and strength” in a leader’s actions (1998, 72). He gave a call to 
arms to his cabinet, stating, “if this long island story of ours is to end at last, let it end only when 
each one of us lies choking in his own blood upon the ground” (qtd. in Jenkins, 2001, 608). 
Moreover, he cleverly invited a larger cabinet group to discuss war, echoing this theme of 
bravery and diction of courage in front of other government officials not usually privy to those 
discussions. Churchill drew hearty praise from those other government officials, demonstrating 
the clear support for his position to Halifax. With Churchill’s persistence and cleverness, Halifax 
backed down and Chamberlin sided with the new Prime Minister (Jenkins, 2001, 609). 
Following a seeming Machiavellian script, Churchill kept Britain in the war. 
 From then on, most of Churchill’s external energies turned to the waging of war and the 
recruitment of allies. Later sections will discuss Churchill’s military affairs and more importantly 




cannot go unnoticed. In his dealings with France and Germany over potential peace negotiations, 
Churchill showed a political aptitude reminiscent of a Machiavellian leader. The Briton was 
clever and resolute in his interactions and decisions, and his remaining fortitude throughout the 
war would guide his foreign affairs toward a Machiavellian frame.  
 
Military Affairs  
 When Churchill came to power, he already had extensive experience in military affairs, 
dating back to the Boer Wars in South Africa (Neillands, 2003, 67). In the nascent stages of 
WWII, he also had been serving in the War Cabinet as head of the British Navy (Jenkins, 2001, 
552). When he became Prime Minister, Churchill continued to act with experience and largely 
remained in line with Machiavellian logic in his military actions and attitudes. 
 Churchill’s first major conflict involved the evacuation of Dunkirk. In the late days of 
May, the Belgian government and army capitulated, leaving the German army bearing down on 
French and British forces stationed in Northern France. With the ineffective French likely to put 
up little resistance, the British forces made for the sea in an attempt to get across the English 
Channel and back to England before being captured or killed. In a remarkable series of events, 
the British managed to return a vast majority of their forces across the Channel, though they did 
abandon most of their military equipment on the beaches of Dunkirk. In all, some 335,000 
soldiers escaped France at Dunkirk, about a third of whom were French. The escape was 
instrumental in allowing Britain and some Allies in exile to continue resisting German expansion 
(Jenkins, 2001, 596).  
Churchill’s decision to flee and defend British soil was both a politically expedient and 




doomed to German capture. While he did make efforts to placate the French government, notably 
with the evacuation of substantial French troops, Churchill ultimately made a calculated decision 
to leave France. He decided that continuing the fight from the ocean-encased British Isles was 
the best, if only, option. Likely, Machiavelli would have applauded Churchill’s choices. First, 
Machiavelli advises his leaders to “carry on great enterprises” (1988, 87). Daring military 
endeavors give leaders repute among the population and garner additional support for future 
action. A last-minute escape across the English Channel was of both “hard practical 
importance… [and] even greater psychological importance” (Jenkins, 2001, 597). Churchill had 
managed to secure Britain against any immediate amphibious invasion while also rallying the 
people. Of greater Machiavellian tone, though, was the Prime Minister’s choice to abandon the 
defense of France altogether. Yet, understanding the likely insurmountable odds of holding off 
the invading Nazi forces, Churchill followed Machiavellian strategy: “a prudent lord… cannot 
observe faith…when such observance turns against him” (Machiavelli, 1988, 69). The situation 
became dire, and Britain could no longer keep its mutual defense pact with France. Instead, 
Churchill fell back to fight another day and continue the war effort. While this retreat 
undoubtedly allowed Allies to continue the war effort and likely had a hand in ultimate French 
liberation, the initial breaking of French faith was an understandable, but Machiavellian move. 
With the continent overrun shortly after, the Battle of Britain began in the late summer of 
1940. German bomber attacks on major British cities became regular, and British air defenses 
sought to protect civilians, military and industry from harm. While not a siege in a traditional 
sense, the Battle was similar in tone and strategic effect. Britain was surrounded, and Germany 
attempted to break down the defenses and morale of the British in order to launch a proper 




being destroyed themselves (Neillands, 2003, 154). Yet the fighting would prove “one of the 
most decisive draws in history,” staving off a German invasion and maintaining active Allied 
resistance in the war (Jenkins, 2001, 630). Churchill’s role throughout the air campaign mirrored 
the Machiavellian advice given to a leader under siege. 
In The Prince, the Florentine urges resolute leadership during a siege, particularly “by 
giving hope to his subjects…[and] fear of the enemy’s cruelty” (1988, 44). Churchill’s rhetoric 
and public actions stand as testaments to this hope under siege and demonization of the Nazi 
enemy. In perhaps his most famous speech, he referred to the battle as necessary to “the survival 
of Christian civilization” in the face of “the abyss of a new dark age made more sinister… by the 
lights of a perverted science.” In the face of this enemy, he called on Britons to stand up for 
“their finest hour” (Jenkins, 2001, 621). The Prime Minster backed up his soaring rhetoric with 
public action. He intentionally made very public visits to sites affected by bombings throughout 
London, and notably kept the government in the city despite the bomb threats. As Machiavelli 
would have wanted, Churchill maintained a hopeful and strong public image, garnering support 
and sustained morale from the citizenry. His character and actions during siege matched a 
Machiavellian framework well. His capacity to keep Britain intact and fighting during the 
prolonged siege proved of immense strategic importance, too. German troops and resources had 
to remain on the Western Front, siphoning resources from the attack on Russia, while the US 
ultimately had a significantly safer launch point from which to invade North Africa and France. 
Churchill’s actions under siege helped preserve the war effort. 
After the eventual entry of the US into the war, Britain and its allies began to shift to 
offensive strategies in the Western European theater. Much of the decision making was shared 




thesis will mainly discuss the give and take in Western Allied strategy in the later Roosevelt and 
Allied Relations section. However, some of Churchill’s Machiavellian thinking, if not his 
execution, was evident in his stances on how to conduct the war effort. Like the other leaders 
throughout the war, Churchill had advocated for opening a second front in the Atlantic theater. 
The major point of contention was where that front should be and when attacking should 
commence. Churchill agreed largely with initial landings in North Africa with Operation Torch 
and strongly pushed for further attacks in the Mediterranean through Sicily and then the Italian 
peninsula (Jenkins, 2001, 704). 
Here, Churchill’s military actions mirrored Machiavellian advice. While everyone 
recognized the need for a second front, Churchill, along with Roosevelt, understood the 
importance of quick, symbolic victories. Strategically, North Africa was worth less than Europe. 
However, after years of defensive maneuvers, rather than waiting for sufficient forces to invade 
France, Churchill opted against waiting for further build-up for any strike. Instead, the attack on 
North Africa constituted a “great enterprise,” that Machiavelli claimed carried esteem, loyalty 
and high morale with the people (1988, 87). As at Dunkirk, Churchill earned a symbolic victory, 
turning around years of defensive maneuvering and stalemate. While the German defenses had 
not been particularly robust in North Africa, the invasion did have some military ramifications, 
particularly as a launching point for an invasion of Italy. After the successful invasion of Sicily, 
the US and British forces jointly pushed onto the Italian mainland and towards Rome (Jenkins, 
2001, 704-13). 
Throughout this process, Churchill recognized the geopolitical peril for Britain in the 
Allied camp. While the US and Russia pushed for an invasion of France, Churchill continued to 




strategy reflected Churchill’s Machiavellian thought process. The Prince warns that a leader 
“must beware never to associate with someone more powerful than himself so as to attack others, 
except when necessity presses” (1988, 91). In the face of a rampant Germany, Churchill 
obviously had no choice but to ally with the more powerful US and USSR. However, as the war 
came closer and closer to an end, Churchill began to think more and more of the end game. In 
particular, he worried about the advance of Russia into the European sphere of influence. His 
urging to put resources into the Italian campaign with hopes of “push[ing] north-east as far as 
possible and pre-empt[ing] the arrival of the Russians in Vienna” reflected his wariness and 
geopolitical awareness (Jenkins, 2001, 738). Machiavelli also would have warned of an 
increasingly powerful and unrestrained Soviet Union. However, Churchill’s fears were not 
translated into action. Churchill acquiesced to the American and Soviet insistence of opening a 
front in Normandy, and Operation Overlord would dominate Western Allied resources at the 
expense of hasty progress in Italy (Jenkins, 2001, 730). 
Ultimately, though, the Allied offensive in France would prove successful and the 
continued push into Germany would bring about the conclusion of the war. Churchill’s military 
choices and expertise certainly were related to that outcome. His military understanding and 
actions followed along a remarkably Machiavellian train of thought, especially during the initial 
stages of the war on the Western Front. Interestingly, though, Churchill’s military successes 
against the Germans weakened Britain’s standing in the world relative to its allies. While 
Churchill was the “crucial center” for the Allies, especially in formation, the involvement of the 
US and the USSR led to Britain’s “relative decline” (Jenkins, 2001, 704). Churchill did not have 
a choice in allying against Germany, but the geopolitical shift and decline of British power is an 




perhaps the most glaring aberration from Machiavelli’s framework during Churchill’s foreign 
and military policy tenure. 
 
Domestic Affairs 
 Domestically, Churchill also had declining power as the war progressed, and failed to 
solidify his rule throughout the conflict. His actions on the home-front in the political sphere 
seemed to fall short of a Machiavellian ideal as Churchill was removed from office before the 
war’s conclusion. His initial actions in unifying the government and creating a strong cabinet of 
advisors, notwithstanding, Churchill’s ultimate dismissal from power departed from the 
Machiavellian framework. 
 Interestingly, Churchill’s tenure as Prime Minister began with a strong exhibition of 
Machiavellian norms. First, he took control over a government of national unity, creating a 
coalition government between the Labour and Conservative parties (Jenkins, 2001, 586). 
Machiavelli urged his leaders to be clever and wary, especially in relation to figures who would 
internally undermine a leader’s power (1988, 69). Here, Churchill was clearly aware of the threat 
to his ruling stability and to the nation’s stability if Labour were to be left out of power. By 
including the opposition, he managed to “caress” a potential political enemy, creating 
dependence and loyalty instead of hostility (Machiavelli, 1988, 10). His initial setup of 
government followed sound Machiavellian strategy. 
 His further designation of cabinet level positions mirrored Machiavellian advice, too. The 
Florentine wanted a “prudent prince” to “choos[e] wise men in his state” and be “a patient 
listener to the truth” (1988, 94-5). Churchill followed this statement in his cabinet appointees, 




588). Machiavelli wanted wisdom in a group of advisors, but also wanted wariness from the 
prince. Good advisors gave good advice, but the mere position of advisor also bound the advisor 
to the leader. Binding the fates of the leader and the advisor would theoretically prevent any 
power grabs. By including powerful politicians, like the recently deposed Chamberlin, in high 
cabinet positions, Churchill put a check on potential ambitions to overtake his premiership role. 
Moreover, he remained diligent in the first year of potential challenges to his authority. Notably, 
after the serious debate over suing for peace with Halifax, Churchill had him transferred to the 
United States as an ambassador (Neillands, 2003, 147). Machiavelli would have agreed with the 
decision to push out a potential rival for power, especially when they were arguing for different 
policies. 
 However, Churchill largely neglected domestic rivals and politics after his first year, 
growing ever more involved in the war effort. This ignorance cost him the premiership in the 
long run. Initial dissatisfaction most notably came to head during the censure debate of July 
1942. Parliament held two days of hearings to criticize Churchill’s running of the war effort. 
While Churchill did “repulse the strongest parliamentary challenge to his five years of wartime 
leadership,” worse electoral challenges would come down the road (Jenkins, 2001, 698). 
 Toward the end of the war, Atlee and other labor members began to more publicly and 
directly criticize Churchill’s actions. At the same time, partisanship grew, fed in part by 
Churchill himself, who had to begin campaigning in earnest in for the June 1945 general 
elections (Jenkins, 2001, 789-92). Yet for various reasons, Churchill’s message rang hollow in 
Great Britain. Despite victory in Europe, Churchill and his party lost power in Parliament during 
the closing months of the war (Jenkins, 2001, 797). The resounding defeat was decidedly not 





 During his premiership, Churchill had focused overwhelmingly on the war effort, and to 
great effect. However, he neglected his domestic audience. Despite some initial indications of 
dissatisfaction, Churchill did not properly tap into the sentiments of the disaffected. Notably, 
Machiavelli urges leaders to “take account of those [diverse] communities” in a state and to even 
meet with them (1988, 91). Churchill did not effectively understand or meet the needs of his UK 
constituents. His military exploits did not prove powerful enough to keep him and his party in 
power. Churchill acted remarkably Machiavellian in his conduct of the war, astutely relying on 
his expertise and advisors to do what was necessary for Britain. However, a state has external 
and internal relations, and Churchill did not prepare properly to maintain authority in the 
domestic sphere. In a seemingly Machiavellian way, chance mixed with preparation threw 
Churchill into power, and the famous Briton’s mixed use of Machiavellian tendencies kept 
Britain intact, but not Churchill’s premiership. 
  
Applied Theory: Roosevelt 
 Franklin D. Roosevelt served longer than any President in US history, and his leadership 
during the Second World War stands out as a remarkably defining period in the nation’s story. 
Without a doubt, his decisions and actions in the buildup to the American entry to the conflict 
and his choices following the declaration of war were instrumental to an ultimate Allied victory. 
The purpose of this thesis, though, is to ascertain whether those leadership decisions followed the 
theoretical advice of Machiavelli in The Prince.  
Based on his participation in foreign, military and domestic affairs, Roosevelt’s decisions 




follow Machiavellian tendencies. His preparations for a Japanese attack in the Pacific departed 
from The Prince’s framework. Further, his handling of the internment of Japanese-Americans on 
the West Coast probably was unnecessarily paranoid, not Machiavellian, much like Stalin’s 
imprisonment of members of the Caucus region during the war. Finally, in his negotiations with 
Stalin, Roosevelt seemed truly lacking as a Machiavellian leader, though that will be discussed in 
a later section. Overall, though, the President acted largely as a Machiavellian prince might if put 
in charge of the American executive. 
 
Foreign Affairs 
 In the buildup to full scale conflict in Europe and following the German invasion of 
Poland, FDR handled US foreign affairs with a delicate, clever and Machiavellian expertise. The 
notable case of ignorance toward Japanese relations proved the largest exception to his execution 
of Machiavellian principles. Despite Machiavelli’s explicit call against neutrality in war, 
Roosevelt’s slow entry into armed conflict actually proved an astute balancing of domestic and 
foreign constituencies. His foreign policy dealings up to his later interactions with Stalin marked 
a close adherence to The Prince. 
 As is well known, FDR kept the United States out of World War II until the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor. Even as aggression mounted in Europe, “Roosevelt swam with the 
isolationist tide” (Smith, 2007, 418). Following World War I and the Great Depression, the 
American public and press overwhelmingly supported remaining neutral and isolated from 
overseas conflicts. The President’s own attitudes were decidedly more internationalist as both 
Germany and Japan began territorial acquisitions, promoting the need for involvement short of 




that war was like the spreading of a “physical disease” or “a contagion,” thus necessitating the 
quarantining of both the sick patient and the spread of war. The shift was a dud in public opinion, 
though, as FDR drily surmised in his quip, “It’s a terrible thing to look over your shoulder when 
you are trying to lead–and to find no one there” (qtd. in Smith, 2007, 419). As the threat of 
violence escalated, though, Roosevelt continued to escalate his rhetoric and political 
maneuvering. His slow coalition building would eventually create a sustained support for some 
level of American involvement, which is discussed in more depth in the domestic affairs section. 
In the broadest political sense, though, Roosevelt wanted to support the Allied cause short of 
going to war, staying in line with public opinion in mid-1941 that showed 81% in opposition to 
entry to war. His neutrality was apparent in that he was “not willing to fire the first shot” (Smith, 
2007, 492). 
 On its face, this resistance to the war violates Machiavellian principles. The Prince holds 
that a leader should “disclose himself in support of someone against another” and “wage open 
war” (89). Roosevelt steadfastly refused to declare open war until the attack on Pearl Harbor. 
While he would publicly denounce Japanese, Italian and German aggressions, he would not 
engage US troops directly in combat. As a foreign policy choice, this did not follow 
Machiavellian thought. His call for open war is explicit, and anything less breeds distrust from 
potential allies and disrespect from potential victors. Yet the President could not act unilaterally 
in the US system. When considering domestic constraints, FDR actually proved quite 
Machiavellian in his slow buildup of support for Allied efforts. The President could not maintain 
power nor gain support from Congress or the public for a war effort. He had to slowly move the 
needle. Roosevelt used the metaphorical cleverness of the fox “to recognize snares” posed by 




support, the President eased resistance to foreign entanglement, retained domestic political 
authority and supported the war effort.  
 In a larger sense, Roosevelt was only truly neutral in his restraint of dedicating American 
lives for the cause, that element of waging open war. Instead, the US waged an economic and 
material war. In terms of military and industrial support, the US would become, in the 
President’s terms, “the arsenal of democracy” (Smith, 2007, 486). When Germany invaded 
Poland, declarations of war from Britain and France quickly followed. After the passage of 
Neutrality Acts earlier in the 1930s, the new laws prevented the US sale of arms to the new 
belligerents (Smith, 2007, 436). Roosevelt could not supply aid to the Allies by law. As a result, 
he set out to change the law, calling for a special session of Congress. While he could not get a 
repeal of the Neutrality Acts, FDR did manage to arrange a “cash-and-carry” basis for weapons 
sales. European powers, in this case the Allies, could purchase weapons provided that they 
offered payment up front and their own transport of supplies back to Europe (Smith, 2007, 438-
41). The brokering of this compromise allowed appeasement for both domestic and foreign 
audiences. The Allies had arms and the American public had peace. 
 Meanwhile, through 1939 and 1940, Britain suffered serious attacks at sea from German 
U-boats. By summer 1940, the island nation was in a position where it likely could not defend its 
trade routes and protect against invasion simultaneously. Britain needed destroyers which the US 
had in ample reserve. With the Neutrality Acts in place, though, a large transfer of ships was 
impossible by law. Roosevelt again found a way, though. Through a number of legal loopholes, 
Roosevelt was able to exchange fifty World War I-era destroyers to Britain in exchange for 99-




maneuvering, Roosevelt was able to resupply British defenses while strengthening America’s 
military capacity closer to home. 
 This trend of military aid continued from 1939 to late-1940, as Britain spent extensively 
on supplies from the US. Yet, as 1940 drew to a close, cash-and-carry “had drained the British 
treasury of its dollar reserves;” soon, the British would have no capacity with which to buy the 
new weapons and material necessary to resisting Germany (Smith, 2007, 482). As with cash-and-
carry, Roosevelt acted decisively, calling for a new policy: Lend-Lease. He introduced the 
concept through a simple analogy comparing the lending of weaponry to a nation at war to the 
lending of a garden hose to a neighbor whose house was on fire. FDR chided, “I don’t say to 
him, ‘Neighbor, my garden hose cost me fifteen dollars.” In the end, after significant public 
rhetoric and gathering of political allies, Roosevelt got the Lend-Lease measure to pass. 
Congress authorized $7 billion in military aid for Britain. Moreover, in this process, Roosevelt 
moved farther and farther from neutrality, explicitly saying that the act marks “the end of 
compromise with tyranny” (Smith, 2007, 485-90). Lend-Lease marked an unambiguous support 
of the Allied war effort short of putting American troops on the ground. Eventually, the program 
was extended to supply the Soviet Union with supplies following the German betrayal of Stalin 
(Smith, 2007, 498). 
 As before, Roosevelt’s actions here are neutral and in violation of Machiavellian 
principles on the surface, but are actually very in line with The Prince when accounting for the 
domestic constraints of a democratic leader. Through his negotiations with Congress and the 
American public, Roosevelt was able to get substantial, non-rhetorical support to Allied forces 
resisting Germany directly. He could not have unilaterally declared war on Germany, but he was 




actually fulfilled the Machiavellian tenet of becoming the “defender of the neighboring lesser 
powers” (Machiavelli, 1988, 11). While Great Britain and the USSR were by no means weak, 
they lacked the industrial and military production capacity of the United States. The American 
direct aid allowed those nations to continue the war while simultaneously giving Roosevelt and 
the US more influence in those foreign countries. Through material and economic support and 
defense, Roosevelt strengthen an alliance and buffer against a rampant Germany. He cleverly 
balanced the needs of the war effort with the demands of the American public, using the US war 
machine to fight Germany, but using Russian and British lives instead. Machiavelli likely would 
have advised the same course of action. 
 In European relations, Roosevelt seemingly followed Machiavellian practice 
overwhelmingly. However, the same could not be said for his dealings with Japan in the Pacific. 
Roosevelt’s general preparations for war and his focus on Europe left a blindspot in regard to 
Japan. Simply, “the deteriorating situation in the Pacific received little attention” (Smith, 2007, 
506). As Japan expanded territorially through Asia, FDR opted to act in retaliation, issuing a 
freeze on Japanese assets in July of 1941. This served as a “de facto embargo that snuffed out 
Japan’s access to petroleum” (Smith, 2007, 517). Naturally, this increased animosity between the 
US and Japan, though the Japanese Prime Minster “desperately sought to prevent war” and 
began to negotiate with the US. Joseph Grew, the ambassador to Japan, was confident that an 
acceptable agreement could take place. Yet, in this time, the President largely did not pay 
attention to Japan, nor did he understand the impacts of his embargo decision. Instead, FDR 
largely ignored his ambassador’s advice, leaving more hawkish cabinet members in charge of the 
negotiation instead. When those failed, the Japanese Prime Minister stepped down and was 




emphasized that with the economic pressure of the embargo, Japan was in a “do-or-die” situation 
and that with the deterioration of relations, war was “not only possible, but probable” (Smith, 
2007, 522-4). Yet, even with a proposal for a cooling off period put on the table, Roosevelt 
ignored the direness of the situation, and allowed the negotiations to end, making war imminent.  
 Roosevelt’s reasoning for acting in such a haphazard way toward a potential foe remains 
confusing for historians: “the subject of speculation,” in the words of scholars Langer and 
Gleason (qtd in Smith, 2007, 525). Concerning the entire breakdown of American-Japanese 
relations over the second-half of 1941, Smith contends that Roosevelt was simply “too consumed 
by the war in Europe,” giving “the Far East too little attention,” with racism and Euro-centrism 
also playing a role (2007, 522). During the initial oil embargo, Roosevelt was largely absent 
from the decision-making processes. The same detachment marked the later negotiations in late 
November, 1941 (Dallek, 1995, 254; Smith, 2007, 529). In his relations with Japan, Roosevelt’s 
actions profoundly depart from Machiavellian ideals. A leader must be concerned with the 
protection of his state, yet Roosevelt pushed the US toward a war that could potentially have 
been avoided or delayed. With resources pouring into Europe, the US could ill-afford to start a 
two-front war in the under-manned Pacific. Yes, Japan was violating tenets of international law, 
and Roosevelt had denounced those practices. However, the President haphazardly issued 
aggressive sanctions without analyzing their full repercussions and even as late as November 
1941 could have still negotiated for a cooling-down period in order to buy time for military 
preparedness. Yet, Roosevelt did not, deviating from Machiavellian tactics. The Prince argues 
that “one should not care about incurring fame of those vices without which it is difficult to save 
one’s state” (1988, 62). While negotiating with an expansionist, militaristic, imperial state was 




Instead of following the Machiavellian path, though, the President largely ignored the problem 
he helped amplify. 
 This abdication of awareness toward Japan marked Roosevelt’s largest foreign policy 
blunder in the years prior to Pearl Harbor. Moreover, the blunder and breakdown of relations 
almost directly led to Pearl Harbor. It is impossible to determine if war with Japan could have 
been prevented through better diplomacy, but Roosevelt’s actions undoubtedly accelerated the 
start of the war. This oversight in the defense of the country did not follow Machiavellian 
principles. However, on the whole, Roosevelt did remarkably well to negotiate the pulls of 
domestic and foreign constituencies. In the build-up to the war, the President managed to keep 
domestic support and morale high while also vigorously supporting the Allied war effort. The 
balancing act was as clever as Machiavelli’s fox. 
 
Military Affairs 
 As in foreign affairs, Roosevelt proved quite adherent to Machiavellian principles in his 
handling of military affairs. The military buildup, the selection of leadership and execution of 
strategic goals largely aligned with The Prince’s framework. Again, Roosevelt’s greatest 
weakness in military affairs involved the buildup to war in the Pacific. Largely, though, those 
decisions fell on subordinates, whom Roosevelt quickly replaced. Overall, though, Roosevelt 
followed the Florentine’s tenet of focusing greatly on the art of war. 
 In the buildup to Nazi aggression, and even after outright war in Europe, Roosevelt 
painstakingly worked to strengthen the American military. His military preparation was broad 
and varied, and reportedly, the president “became consumed with defense and foreign policy” in 




contain Hitler, and Roosevelt called for “five thousand warplanes and the capacity to produce ten 
thousand more within the next few months” (qtd. in Smith, 2007, 428). After the outright 
outbreak of hostilities in France in May 1940, Roosevelt stood before Congress and asked for 
further increased military production to the tune of a $1.2 billion outlay, which would cover a 
near ten-fold increase in plane production and modernization of the Army and Navy. A month 
later, he asked for another $1.9 billion. Over the course of the next year, Congress, at 
Roosevelt’s urging, had appropriated $37.3 billion for defense alone, “a figure roughly four 
times the entire federal budget of 1939” (Smith, 2007, 446). The massive increase in technical 
and industrial production was soon matched by an increase in manpower, too. In August, 1940, 
Roosevelt threw his support behind a peace-time draft. With his backing, the bill would 
eventually pass later in the month, and by mid-1941, the Army had grown from less than 
200,000 men in 1939 to over 1.4 million (Smith, 2007, 467). However, perhaps Roosevelt’s most 
important decision before America’s entry into the war involved military leadership. The 
President changed command of the Army, handing the Chief of Staff role to George C. Marshall. 
Marshall was not the obvious choice, 34th on the list of seniority and a graduate of VMI, not 
West Point. Yet, his leadership would prove essential to the military’s success throughout the 
conflict and beyond (Smith, 2007, 432-3). 
 These preparations and devotion to defense put Roosevelt overwhelmingly in-line with 
Machiavellian tactics on military matters. First and foremost, the Florentine argues that “a wise 
prince should… never remain idle in peaceful times” (1988, 60). Even though the US was not 
technically at war, Roosevelt spent his energy, and his budget, on defense. Recognizing threats to 
the state, Roosevelt moved to defend it with unprecedented spending and action. The peacetime 




politicking by the president. He worked privately with a citizens’ framing group to pitch the draft 
to the public; he allowed his cabinet leaders to speak strongly in favor of it, and eventually he 
came out publicly in support as well (Smith, 2007, 464-6). Despite peace, Roosevelt prepared for 
war. His appointment of Marshall to the Chief of Staff of the Army, too, aligned with 
Machiavellian advice, reflecting the need for a leader to “choos[e] wise men in his state” 
(Machiavelli, 1988, 94). Marshall, by all accounts, was an exceptional commander, the eventual 
“organizer of victory” in Winston Churchill’s estimation (Morrow, 1997, 5). Marshall was not 
the obvious choice by seniority, but he was the correct choice for Roosevelt under the guidelines 
of astute leadership required by The Prince. 
Roosevelt made a number of other key military appointments against the grain of 
orthodoxy, notably Dwight D. Eisenhower as the supreme commander in Europe and Douglas 
MacArthur to the command in the Pacific, as well as Chester Nimitz in charge of the Pacific 
fleet. Eisenhower was 252nd on Army lists before the North African invasion, MacArthur had 
detractors in the War Department and Nimitz lacked enthusiastic support of senior admirals. Yet 
Roosevelt had an eye for talented advisors and, following the appointment of Eisenhower, the 
president largely stayed out of the immediate running of military affairs, leaving his generals to 
do their work (Smith, 2007, 598).  
The President’s delegation of military authority to largely his generals’ discretion has an 
ambiguous parallel in the framework of The Prince. Literally, the text reads that “a prince should 
have no other object…but that of war and its orders and disciplines,” implying direct and 
consistent interactions and control over military affairs (1988, 58). However, Roosevelt did 
largely the opposite, choosing not to “second-guess or micromanage the military,” rather giving 




598). On its face, this seems to violate Machiavelli’s insistence for a leader to focus on little but 
war. Certainly, Roosevelt was much more hands-off in military affairs than either Churchill or 
Stalin.  
In a Renaissance context of Machiavelli’s writing, this stance would have been 
problematic. In a modern context, though, the apparatus of both the state and the military were 
significantly more complex than Machiavelli could have imagined. By appointing the best 
military commanders and remaining hands-off, Roosevelt was likely following the spirit of 
Machiavelli’s principle. The President could not realistically be a complete military expert and 
occupy his whole efforts with the tactical choices of the war. Whereas Stalin meddled 
ineffectively with military tactics, often overruling his generals, Roosevelt let his experts use 
their expertise. Machiavelli recognizes that a leader should “choos[e] wise men in his state” and 
heed their advice when correct (1998, 94). In his appointment of particular commanders, rather 
than the top-ranking officials, Roosevelt intentionally selected the wise men in his state to advise 
him. He used their expertise in military affairs as an extension of his own. Machiavelli would 
likely approve of such intelligence. 
 Following the “day of infamy,” the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 
1941, Roosevelt did make a few important and direct military interventions, though (Dallek, 
1995, 312). First, alongside Churchill, he advocated for opening up a new front as soon as 
possible against Germany. While Marshall and the other generals wanted to conserve resources 
for a cross-channel invasion into France, which would have likely occurred in 1943, Roosevelt 
wanted more immediate action, pushing for an attack on German-held North Africa. Despite 
“robust objections of the American joint chiefs,” the President ordered Operation Torch to 




As Marshall admitted in retrospect, “We failed to see that the leader in a democracy has to keep 
the people entertained…the people demand action. We couldn’t wait to be completely ready” 
(qtd. in Smith, 2007, 561). Roosevelt made other key and controversial decisions, notably his 
transfer of ships and naval aircraft from the Pacific to the Atlantic theater in order to halt the 
German U-boat campaign. He again went against the advice of his Joints Chiefs of Staff, but was 
again vindicated with the forced withdrawal of the German submarine fleet from the North 
Atlantic and the subsequent security of American and British shipping lanes (Smith, 2007, 571; 
Dalek, 1995, 286).  
 These decisions reflect a remarkably analogous adherence to the framework of The 
Prince. First and foremost, Machiavelli wanted his leaders to be military experts. Roosevelt’s 
choices to overrule his commanders demonstrated his focus on the “art… of war and its orders 
and disciplines” (Machiavelli, 1998, 58). Roosevelt understood the broader strategic necessities 
of the war better than his generals. He recognized the need to engage quickly with Germany and 
to protect Atlantic shipping lanes. At a base military level, attacking North Africa was a 
sideshow of less strategic importance than continental Europe. However, Roosevelt acted with a 
Machiavellian understanding that he had to please the public. Marshall’s quip about keeping the 
people “entertained” mirrors two sentiments espoused in The Prince. Namely, Machiavelli holds 
that a leader should carry on “great enterprises” and “keep the people occupied with festivals and 
spectacles” (1988, 87; 91). The Florentine meant for leaders to keep their citizens occupied with 
various religious and cultural festivals typical of the Renaissance era. However, this action was 
done to placate the populace and to garner loyalty to the leader. Marshall recognized similar 
effects in Roosevelt’s decision to invade North Africa. He had to engage in war as soon as 




Europe and took resources away from a future cross-Channel invasion. Roosevelt carried out a 
literal “great enterprise” in a Machiavellian sense, captivating the US public with a military 
campaign, demonstrating American ambition and capacity simultaneously (Machiavelli, 1988, 
87). The choice to attack earlier on a less important target was a calculated political move, just as 
The Price would suggest. 
As a military leader, Roosevelt was remarkably Machiavellian. While somewhat hands-
off, his success at selecting capable military commanders mirrored The Prince’s importance of 
selecting strong advisors, especially considering his selections were not orthodox or obvious. 
Further, when he did occasionally intervene, Roosevelt did so with a broader understanding of 
the military-political interaction than his military-focused commanders. He used the cunning and 




 Perhaps unsurprisingly given his Machiavellian techniques in foreign and military affairs, 
Roosevelt managed to balance domestic affairs with a largely Machiavellian cunning. His 
appointments and 1940 and 1944 elections reflect an understanding of how to maintain power 
and balance competing constituencies. The glaring aberration from Machiavellian decision-
making domestically again follows from his relations with Japan, in this case his choice to intern 
Japanese-Americans on the West Coast. As with Stalin and his jailing of dissidents in the 
Caucuses, Roosevelt’s interning of Japanese-Americans reflected more paranoia than 




needlessly and cruelly isolated and removed an entire ethnic group, falsely thinking it would 
promote stability. 
 First, following the outbreak of war in Europe and before the US entry into the conflict, 
Roosevelt was faced with the 1940 election. Unlike any president in US history, Roosevelt had 
opted to run for a third term in office. It was by no means obvious that he would win. Early polls 
in October put his opponent, Wendell Willkie, ahead 53% to 47%. However, Roosevelt would 
ultimately take 55% of the popular vote and win the electoral college, 449 to 82 (Smith, 2007, 
475-9). While his success is difficult to attribute to any single action, the President made a few 
campaigning decisions that undoubtedly aided him. Notably, before the Republican nominating 
convention, Roosevelt brought two key Republicans into his administration, Henry Stimson and 
Frank Knox, to head the War and Navy Departments, respectively. This move “exposed the deep 
fissure in the GOP over foreign policy,” with Stimson and Knox aligning with FDR and his 
internationalist focus, contrasting the isolationist wing of the Republican party (Smith, 2007, 
450).  While bringing more aggressive elements to his cabinet, Roosevelt also assured the 
country publicly at the same time, “your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars,” 
pitching to the war-wary populous (Smith, 2007, 477). Combined with his other speeches and 
public stances, Roosevelt convinced the US to elect him to a third term. Shortly after, the 
President was importantly able to make his electoral opponent, Willkie, his political ally 
following the election. After meeting with FDR in the Oval Office, Willkie publicly defended 
Lend-Lease and would help unite Republican support behind Roosevelt’s foreign policy (Smith, 
2007, 488-90). By the time of the 1944 election, Roosevelt’s coalition held firm and he won 




 From the start of the war, Roosevelt managed to maintain a powerful grip on domestic 
politics. While he could not unilaterally force decisions, he was remarkably effective at building 
a governing coalition and keeping his administration in power. In doing so, Roosevelt followed a 
Machiavellian framework. The Prince argued that a leader should “be on guard against [the great 
in society]” (1988, 40). In the context of the domestic US, Roosevelt, a staunch Democrat, had 
enemies in the Republican party who fit the “great” stature. In a Machiavellian sense, he had to 
be wary of these potential threats to his power. Instead of making new enemies, though, 
Roosevelt made allies. He brought in powerful Republican military voices to his cabinet in Knox 
and Stimson, obligating the two GOP stalwarts to his administration. Machiavelli specifically 
encouraged making the great “obligated in everything to [the prince’s] fortune,” and “mak[ing] 
use of those who are of good counsel” (1988, 40). Knox and Stimson fit this description 
perfectly, strengthening Roosevelt’s circle of advisors while weakening power bases from which 
he could be defeated. Gaining the political and policy support of Willkie followed in the same 
vein, taking a powerful opponent and making him into an ally. Roosevelt’s maneuvering 
represents the classic Machiavellian metaphor of being a fox, capable of “recogniz[ing] snares” 
and using cleverness to avoid them (Machiavelli, 1988, 69). He had strong domestic opposition 
after eight years of leadership, but managed to gain re-election and continue to build a sizeable 
coalition regardless.  
 Broadly, Roosevelt did well to maintain domestic political appeal and control, but in the 
case of Japanese-Americans, the President erred. In February of 1942, shortly after the attack on 
Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt issued Executive Order 9066. This order unilaterally ordered West 
Coast residents of Japanese descent, both first-generation and their children, out of their homes 




camps for the vast majority of the duration of the war, losing most of their property and assets in 
the process. On its face, Roosevelt issued the order out of “military necessity,” fearing a West 
Coast invasion by the Japanese, which could then be supported by aid and sabotage of the 
Japanese descendants in the area. (Smith, 2007, 549-52). However, there was scant evidence that 
military necessity required the removal and internment of lawful US residents. Multiple military 
and security experts at the time declared the removal “utterly unwarranted” or “wild, farcical, 
and fantastic stuff” (qtd. in Smith, 2007, 549). Yet, Roosevelt also heard competing views from 
public opinion, the press, political delegations in California, and members of the War 
Department. Ultimately, Roosevelt deferred to his War Department and the Assistant Secretary 
for domestic security made the decision. The Japanese would be rounded up on the West Coast. 
 In terms of defense, Roosevelt’s decision was decidedly not Machiavellian and reflected 
the same racism and ignorance that had led to the accelerated enmity with Japan and lack of 
preparedness of the Pearl Harbor attack. From a simple military perspective, Roosevelt wasted 
resources and a potential support in removing Japanese-Americans from the West Coast and 
guarding them throughout the war period. Machiavelli wanted his leaders to be military experts, 
and forcibly removing Japanese-Americans took away manpower, money and materials from 
fighting the Japanese and the Germans. Thus, Roosevelt’s decision to inter the residents of 
Japanese descents violated the Machiavellian framework. However, once that choice was taken, 
Roosevelt’s execution closely mirrored The Prince. Throughout the issue, the President did not 
care for the constitutionality of the forced removal of an ethnic group. While Machiavelli wanted 
leaders to “appear to have [virtues],” a good leader “should not care about incurring fame of 
those vices without which it is difficult to save one’s state” (1988, 70; 62). In the US context, the 




that the Japanese-Americans were a threat to the state, however erroneous that decision was, he 
acted, regardless of vice. He acted in a way that he believed was necessary to “save one’s state,” 
even if it was unconstitutional and immoral (Machiavelli, 1988, 62). Moreover, he was able to 
push this new domestic order “by force,” something Machiavelli allows as an acceptable 
domestic policy (1988, 24). While his decision making was terribly flawed and tinged by racism, 
paranoia and pandering to public opinion, Roosevelt’s execution of Order 9066 did follow 
Machiavellian tactics, though it was not a Machiavellian decision. 
  In all, the domestic assessment of Roosevelt’s tenure reflects political efficacy largely in 
tune to Machiavellian principles. In terms of maintaining power and building a coalition, 
Roosevelt survived in office longer than any other US president thanks to cunning and adroit 
politicking. Even his execution of Japanese internment was ruthlessly Machiavellian, though the 
choice itself was remarkably flawed and violated The Prince’s imperative to focus on war and 
state security. 
 
 Overall, Roosevelt proved a surprisingly Machiavellian leader. In his foreign, military 
and domestic affairs, the President demonstrated a clever capacity and awareness of the political 
balancing act necessary for rule. He created a domestic and foreign coalition that was capable of 
winning World War II and maintaining power until his death in the spring of 1945. His few 
aberrations from Machiavellian principles came in his relations with the Japanese and with 
Stalin. Racism clouded his military judgements of Japan and of Japanese-Americans, leading to 
accelerated conflict, a lack of preparedness for war and police-state style military internment, 
none of which expedited Allied victory. In the case of Stalin, he ultimately ceded too much 




Machiavellian shortcomings did not shroud FDR’s overall stature as leader, though. The 
President may not have intended it, but his leadership during WWII largely aligned with The 
Prince. 
 
Applied Theory: Allied Relations 
 Unsurprisingly, given their status as Allies, Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt interacted 
throughout the war period. In these interactions, all the leaders demonstrated some Machiavellian 
traits, but in these negotiations, Stalin most closely mirrored The Prince’s framework using 
cunning and ruthlessness to achieve a vast majority of Soviet goals. While there were a number 
of key interactions, the most important involved Churchill and Roosevelt’s Atlantic Charter, their 
Quebec Agreement to share nuclear weapons technology and the two tripartite conferences in 
Tehran and Yalta in 1943 and 1945 respectively. 
 As Britain initially went to war with Germany, Churchill desperately wanted American 
participation in the conflict. His courting of Roosevelt marked a very intentional and successful 
foreign relations tilt to supply Britain with resources to resist Nazi attacks and ultimately 
encourage direct American involvement in the war. Roosevelt’s supply of war materials to 
Britain reflected an American desire, but also an intentional push by the Churchill. Cash and 
Carry, Lend-Lease and the Destroyer-Land Base deals pushed through Congress by Roosevelt 
originated with asks from Churchill (Jenkins, 2001, 615).  
 In this process of asking for aid and alliance from the US, Churchill was forced into a 
non-Machiavellian decision. The Prince clearly states that a good leader “has preferred to lose 
with his own [arms] than to win with others” (1988, 55). Without a doubt, Churchill was reliant 




Machiavelli urges that “a prince must beware never to associate with someone more powerful 
than himself so as to attack others, except when necessity presses” (1988, 91). The Atlantic 
Charter all-but finalized the Anglo-American alliance in the early Fall of 1941. The Charter laid 
out eight key principles that the US and Britain desired in a post-war world that would eventual 
become the enduring policy positions of the Western Allies (Smith, 2007, 502). Churchill had 
clearly tied his ship of state to the Americans. On its face, these decisions marked Churchill as 
running against the Machiavellian grain. However, the clause “except when necessity presses” 
defined the Prime Minister’s situation. Without American supplies, Germany would likely have 
overrun the British Isles. The very survival of Churchill’s state was at stake, so he turned to an 
alliance to ward off ultimate destruction. While survival vindicated his decision to seek alliance 
and aid, the UK’s “relative decline” compared to the US and later the USSR in world affairs was 
the price (Jenkins, 2001, 704).  
 In all of this, Roosevelt came out looking quite Machiavellian. He protected a “lesser” or 
declining power in Britain, garnering a loyal and indebted ally (Machiavelli, 1988, 11). He did 
not remain neutral in a conflict, sending everything but troops to the fight, gaining repute from 
the international community (Machiavelli, 1988, 89). Finally, he helped dictate the policy for a 
post-world order that clearly favored the United States via free trade, allowing Americans to later 
“follow their [economic] interests (Machiavelli, 1988, 91). Intentionally or not, Roosevelt used 
the desperate situation of the war to improve America’s global standing. 
Likewise, Stalin used the war to the Soviet Union’s political advantage. Only in Stalin’s 
relations to Allied help from the US and Britain did he demonstrate a truly Machiavellian foreign 
affairs strategy, notably in his use of Lend-Lease and in his policy dominance and trickery at 




and attack, the Soviets needed aid, just as the British did. The massive import of US supplies and 
machines helped stem and ultimately turn the German advance. Here is where Stalin’s 
maneuvering helped expand Soviet power rather than see its relative decline as was the case with 
Britain. Simply, Stalin was steadfast in his negotiating positions and ruthless in his tactics, first at 
Tehran and then at Yalta. At Tehran, he wanted a promptly opened cross-channel invasion and 
received promises for a May 1944 date. He wanted expanded Soviet territory in Poland and 
received assurances of a new border. Moreover, to keep updates on Roosevelt, Stalin “bugged 
FDR’s suite and knew the details of every conversation” (Smith, 2007, 595). Stalin knew what 
was happening, and more importantly, as a member of the British contingent later put, the Soviet 
leader got “exactly what he wanted” (qtd, in Conquest, 1991, 263).  
At Yalta, the largest debates involved the installation of a new Polish government, the 
occupation of Germany and the formation of the United Nations. Yet, in early 1944, “the war 
had progressed to such a point that political decisions could do little more than ratify military 
reality” (Smith, 2007, 631). While agreement was forthcoming about the UN and the zones of 
occupation, Poland would be a harbinger of the Cold War. Stalin promised free and open 
elections, but those never came as Poland was transformed into a satellite state of the USSR. 
Roosevelt would later say in his final days, Stalin “has broken every one of the promises he 
made at Yalta” (qtd. in Conquest, 1991, 265). 
Stalin’s actions in relation to Churchill and Roosevelt fall perfectly in place with The 
Prince. A Machiavellian leader needs to be both a metaphorical lion and a metaphorical fox, 
using brains and brawn (Machiavelli, 1988, 69). In negotiations, Stalin held firm and strong on 
his positions, while also engaging in ruthless and sly behavior like eavesdropping, exemplifying 




Stalin would put on air of friendliness and openness. Particularly with Roosevelt, Stalin appeared 
warm and often cordial, allowing the President to greatly misjudge his character. Machiavelli 
wanted his leaders “to appear to have [virtues],” and these apparent traits masked many of the 
inherent vices Stalin was set on undertaking (1988, 70). He simply took advantage of the good 
faith placed in him by Roosevelt, and to a lesser extent, Churchill, and expanded his power 
throughout Eastern Europe as a result. He refused to “observe faith,” as Machiavelli advised, 
when upholding pacts no longer favored him, instead breaking the agreements at Yalta and 
Tehran in order to expand his influence (Machiavelli, 1988, 69). Stalin effectively took 
advantage of the US and the UK diplomatically, while also taking military aid in return. 
Roosevelt had given away tools of war and expansion without creating any regional zones of 
influence in or around the Soviet Union. Where Roosevelt faltered, Stalin took advantage. 
The one incredibly important tool that Churchill and Roosevelt kept from Stalin during 
the war was the nuclear bomb. Both Roosevelt and Churchill independently had scientific teams 
researching the possibility of nuclear fission to be used as a weapon, and the two leaders 
ultimately agreed to work jointly and share information in order to expedite the process, looking 
to create an atomic bomb before the Germans (Smith, 2007, 579-81). Successful tests of the 
operational nuclear bomb were not completed until after Roosevelt’s death and Churchill’s 
election loss, but the two executives spearheaded a remarkably Machiavellian project and 
weapon. 
A nuclear warhead fit neatly into the framework of The Prince. Probably no other 
weapon was more capable of fulfilling the more distasteful Machiavellian tenets like: enemies 
“should be caressed or eliminated;” leaders “should not care about the infamy of cruelty;” and 




1988, 10; 65; 67-9). No weapon at the time was as capable of invoking elimination, cruelty and 
fear with same intensity as an atomic bomb. In agreeing to research weaponized nuclear fission, 
the Prime Minister and the President embodied the Machiavellian traits attributed to the bomb. 
Churchill and Roosevelt did not order the use of the nuclear bombs on Japan, but they enabled 
the later mass destruction for the sake of victory and the security of their states. Their choice was 
ruthless, with victory at any cost. Their bomb would ultimately bring the war to a close in 
August 1945. 
In all, Allied relations during the war circulated around diplomacy. All three leaders can 
lay partial claim to winning the war thanks to their individual and collective efforts, and state 
survival and supremacy is certainly something admired in The Prince. However, Machiavellian 
foreign relations largely hinge on the balance of power between states, and Stalin likely was 
most adept at improving his international standing. Churchill ceded much of Britain’s dominance 
for survival, and the US grew to be the dominant force in the West as a result of the war and 
Roosevelt’s actions. However, Stalin’s maneuvering in relation to the rest of the Allies allowed 
him to gain more power than perhaps expected, reflecting a ruthless Machiavellian technique. 
The balance of power shaped by World War II would cast shadows that would ultimately define 
the Cold War. 
 
Conclusion 
 Given their individual and collective actions during the war, Stalin, Churchill and 
Roosevelt undoubtedly acted in a Machiavellian fashion on many occasions. However, each 
leader had varying adherence to the framework set out in The Prince, and no leader followed all 




demonstrated three key findings. First, the research helped isolate a normative Machiavellian 
leader from a descriptive Machiavellian image of the political world. Next, this work applied 
Machiavelli’s framework to the WWII careers of Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt, recognizing 
their adherence to and aberrations from its principles. Finally, this thesis offered a new 
methodology for leadership analysis, taking a classic text and applying it to semi-modern 
examples.  
 This analysis of The Prince focused on normative statements depicting how Machiavelli 
wanted a prince to lead. The text also includes descriptive statements on Machiavelli’s realist 
and somewhat cynical understanding of politics and human nature, but those were not taken into 
account for creating a leadership framework. It would have been almost impossible to ascertain 
if any of the Big Three firmly believed Machiavelli’s descriptions of the way the political world 
operates. However, the text could be analyzed based on what leaders should do according to the 
Florentine. By looking at normative statements, like “the prince must” or “a prince should,” this 
thesis selected key actions a Machiavellian leader should take (Machiavelli, 1988, 42, 58). These 
actions, and Machiavelli’s name, often conjure connotations of amoral and ruthless leadership. 
Certainly, his guidance on leaders’ personal conduct reflected an aberration from traditional 
morals, where The Prince encouraged the appearance of virtue, while in reality allowing for 
whatever was necessary to maintain loyalty, control and ultimately power, even through the use 
of fear and force. Especially domestically, control and loyalty were important in placating the 
public and maintaining a grip on rule. Foreign and military affairs reflected this maintenance of 
control, with foreign and military actions often encouraging and consolidating domestic support 
of a prince. The other element of foreign and military affairs worked to secure a state against 




allowed to maintain power internationally were broad in scope and loose in restrictions. 
However, amoral may be the wrong descriptor for these Machiavellian traits. In truth, he was a 
Renaissance realist, who viewed state leadership as putting order into chaos, both in a foreign 
and domestic sense. Machiavelli’s distinction was the lengths at which he was willing to go to 
maintain that order and control. The Big Three followed the Florentine’s framework to varying 
degrees. 
 Joseph Stalin certainly had no qualms with doing what he viewed as necessary to 
maintain power and control. Stalin often used his military and police forces with little remorse as 
to the consequences he was inflicting upon his soldiers, people and others. His sheer 
determination to win the war was somewhat Machiavellian, but his conduct leading up to the war 
and during the conflict lacked the cunning the Florentine would want out of a fox-like prince. 
While he did buy time to prepare for conflict with Germany through an initial non-aggression 
pact, he did not use that time prepare wisely and arrogantly hindered the Soviet Union’s military 
preparedness through overruling, expulsion and execution of Soviet officers before and during 
the war. Stalin did maintain power, though, and increased the USSR’s international standing 
through deception, force and will, especially when relating to Churchill and Roosevelt. Overall, 
then, Stalin’s performance as a Machiavellian leader during the war was mixed. He was ruthless 
and steadfast, but often his decisions were imprecise and tinged by paranoia and ignorance. 
Stalin kept and expanded his power, but a true Machiavellian could have done so at less cost. 
 Churchill was significantly more Machiavellian in foreign and military affairs than Stalin, 
reflecting an understanding that the Soviet leader lacked. His actions following the fall of France, 
in recruiting support from the United States, in withstanding German siege and in advocating for 




However, Churchill had to navigate an existential threat to British global power. In enlisting the 
Allies help, he saved his state, but helped speed the decline and prominence of the Empire. 
Churchill’s actions helped embolden and empower the US and the USSR to rise to dominance on 
the world stage. Most importantly, Churchill’s actions cost him his own personal power, losing 
re-election just as the war was ending. Throughout the conduct of the war, Churchill adeptly 
handled British affairs, but he deviated from Machiavellian tenets domestically and lost his rule 
as a result. Churchill rose to the occasion that chance provided him and saved Britain but fell 
short of The Prince when he failed to save himself. 
Of the three Allied leaders, Franklin D. Roosevelt may have been the most 
Machiavellian. Masterful in balancing foreign, military and domestic pressures, FDR used 
cunning to build powerful and winning coalitions on the home-front and abroad. Particularly in 
his handling of a recalcitrant public and Congress, Roosevelt managed to massively aid Britain 
and the Soviets in the war effort, all while maintaining his own domestic bedrock. Further, his 
decisions once the US entered the war reflected a wise military and political mind and a knack 
for selecting strong advisors. The decision to vigorously pursue the atomic bomb exemplified a 
Machiavellian ruthlessness. Only in his racist underestimation of Japan and his misplaced trust in 
Stalin did FDR violate Machiavellian principles. On the whole, though, the President kept power 
domestically and won the war abroad, using many techniques outlined in The Prince along the 
way. 
 Taken together, all of this research demonstrates that Machiavelli still has relevance in a 
modern political context. Leadership analysis can provide insight to both classic works and 
modern history, in this case Machiavelli to the Second World War. Through research and 




Three in a new political lens, offering new perspectives on their legacies. Interestingly, 
presidents, premiers and prime ministers do indeed follow frameworks outlined in The Prince, 
and Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill each represented different aspects of Machiavelli’s ideal 
leader to varying extents. These towering figures of the 20th century may not have recognized the 
comparisons in their actions with those in The Prince, but nonetheless they often mirrored the 
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